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GLOBAL RATE SETTING: 
A SOLUTION FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS? 
Jorge L. Contreras* 
Abstract: The commitment to license patents that are essential to technical interoperability 
standards on terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) is a fundamental 
mechanism that enables standards to be developed collaboratively by groups of competitors. 
Yet disagreements over FRAND royalty rates continue to bedevil participants in global 
technology markets. Allegations of opportunistic hold-up and hold-out arise with increasing 
frequency, spurring competition authorities to investigate and intervene in private standard-
setting. And litigation regarding compliance with FRAND commitments has led courts around 
the world to adjudicate FRAND royalty rates, often on a global basis, but using very different 
methodologies and doctrinal approaches. The issues affecting the FRAND licensing system 
can be summarized as deficiencies in transparency, consistency, and comprehensiveness. 
Together, these issues reduce the overall fairness and efficiency of the system and result in 
excess administrative and transactional costs. This Article lays out a roadmap for the 
establishment of a global FRAND rate-setting tribunal that promotes the tripartite goals of 
transparency, consistency, and comprehensiveness by determining the aggregate value of 
patents covering a particular standard and allocating that value among individual patents and 
patent holders. This tribunal is modeled on the U.S. Copyright Royalty Board and similar rate-
setting agencies, though it is envisioned not as a governmental body but as an international 
non-governmental organization. Such a tribunal should bring greater predictability and 
stability to the technology development ecosystem while reducing inefficient litigation. 
  
                                                     
* Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. This Article has benefitted 
from presentation and feedback at the Stanford University Hoover Institution 2019 Conference on the 
Market for Regulation in the Internet of Things, the 8th Annual Patent Conference (PatCon) at 
University of San Diego, the 7th International Intellectual Property Roundtable at Duke University, 
and the IP Day 2018 Conference at Boston University. The author is grateful for commentary and 
discussion by Jim Bessen, Graeme Dinwoodie, Richard Evensen, Justin Hughes, Sir Robin Jacob, 
Ron Laurie, Luke McLeroy, Michael Meurer, Lisa Ouellette, Sarah Rajec, Lisa Ramsey, Joshua 
Sarnoff, Norman Siebrasse, Eric Talley, Sang-Seung Yi and Peter Yu, among others. Research 
assistance by Luke Hanks is gratefully acknowledged.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Technical interoperability standards lie at the heart of some of the 
largest litigation battles and corporate transactions in recent years. 
Samsung’s patent infringement suits against Apple in the United States, 
European Union, Korea, Japan, and elsewhere—fought at the height of 
the global smart phone wars—turned on the use of patented 3G and 4G 
wireless telecommunications technology.1 Recent takeover battles among 
                                                     
1. See Jorge L. Contreras, The Global Standards Wars: Patent and Competition Disputes in North 
America, Europe and Asia, KEIO U. J.L. POLITICS & SOC. 9–10 (2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3106090 [https://perma.cc/KUQ2-TK8M] 
[hereinafter Contreras, Global Standard Wars]; Hitomi Iwase & Takahiro Sugauchi, Apple v. 
Samsung: Enforcing a Standards-Essential Patent After a FRAND Declaration, 2014 IP VALUE 102 
(2014). 
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Intel, Broadcom, Qualcomm, and NXP underlie a battle for dominance in 
the market for standardized networking and communications chips.2 
These standards, which range from simple physical compatibility 
features such as the three-pronged electrical plug to hugely complex 
wireless telecommunications protocols, enable products manufactured by 
different vendors to interface seamlessly and automatically with one 
another. Such standards, and the widespread product interoperability that 
they enable, can promote innovation, reduce development costs, increase 
consumer utility, and produce significant market efficiencies known as 
“network effects.”3 The importance of standards continues to grow in 
today’s interconnected global economy. Efforts are now under way to 
develop future generations of mobile broadband communications 
protocols known as “5G” and “6G,”4 as well as standards that will link a 
vast array of devices embedded in personal accessories, medical devices, 
vehicles, home appliances, and the built environment: the so-called 
“Internet of Things.”5 
Most of the thousands of technical standards implemented in products 
today—from Wi-Fi to LTE to HTML—were developed by firms 
collaborating within industry associations known as standards-
development organizations (SDOs).6 As a result, these firms hold 
hundreds, thousands, or tens of thousands of patents covering key 
interoperability standards, particularly in the telecommunications and 
                                                     
2. See Danny Crichton, The Incredible Multi-Dimension Chess of Qualcomm vs. Broadcom, 
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 10, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/10/qualcomm-vs-broadcom/ 
[https://perma.cc/89XS-R3UW]. 
3. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE 
NETWORK ECONOMY 45–46 (1999); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 33 (2007) 
[hereinafter DOJ-FTC ANTITRUST & IPR]. 
4. Sascha Segan, With 5G Still in the Works, 6G Is Already Taking Shape, PCMAG (Apr. 19, 2018, 
12:25 PM), https://www.pcmag.com/article/360533/what-is-6g [https://perma.cc/DH5N-LEWE]. 
5. Ahmed Banafa, IoT Standardization and Implementation Challenges, IEEE INTERNET OF 
THINGS (July 12, 2016), https://iot.ieee.org/newsletter/july-2016/iot-standardization-and-
implementation-challenges.html [https://perma.cc/8TU3-5QW8]. 
6. SDOs encompass a wide range of organizations, from semi-official international bodies (e.g., 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI)) to large private organizations (e.g., the IEEE Standards Association and 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)), to smaller groups often referred to as “consortia” that focus 
on one or a handful of related standards (e.g., the HDMI Forum and Bluetooth Special Interest Group). 
See generally Brad Biddle, No Standard for Standards: Understanding the ICT Standards-
Development Ecosystem, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: 
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 17 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018). The term SDO is often 
used interchangeably with the term SSO (standard setting organization). While fine distinctions can 
be made, for purposes of this Article I treat these terms as synonymous. 
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computing industries.7 In order to address concerns about the leverage that 
holders of such patents may exert after a standard is widely adopted (so-
called patent “hold-up”),8 SDOs have adopted policies requiring their 
participants to license patents that are “essential” to their standards 
(standards-essential patents or SEPs) on terms that are royalty-free or that 
bear royalties that are “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” 
(FRAND).9 Antitrust and competition authorities around the world have 
recognized that commitments to license SEPs at rates that are no higher 
than FRAND are important to standardization.10 The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement11 and 
the SDO accreditation requirements of the American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI)12 both reflect the importance of such commitments. 
Today, most SDOs around the world require some form of licensing 
commitment for patents that are necessary to implement their standards, 
and those commitments often require terms that are FRAND.13 
                                                     
7. See, e.g., Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, Mapping Standards to Patents Using Declarations of 
Declared Standard-Essential Patents and Systems of Technological Classification, 27 J. ECON. & 
MGMT. STRATEGY 504, 521, tbl.7 (2018) (mapping number of declared patents to particular 
standards—e.g., the 4G LTE standard is subject to 430 patent declarations by 65 different companies, 
representing 45,279 different patents; the 3G UMTS standard is subject to 500 patent declarations by 
63 different companies, representing 39,748 different patents); KNUT BLIND ET AL., STUDY ON THE 
INTERPLAY BETWEEN STANDARDS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPRS), FINAL REPORT 62 
(2011). 
8. See generally Norman V. Siebrasse, Holdup, Holdout and Royalty Stacking: A Review of the 
Literature, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS, (C. 
Bradford Biddle et al., eds. (forthcoming 2019)), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2902780 [https://perma.cc/S658-46HY]. 
9. SDOs that require royalty-free licensing of SEPs generally also require that non-royalty terms 
be fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory. However, this Article uses the term FRAND to refer to 
royalty-bearing licenses. In addition, following customary practice, the terms FRAND and RAND 
(reasonable and nondiscriminatory) are used interchangeably. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL 
PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 1 n.2 (2013) [hereinafter DOJ/PTO 
POLICY STATEMENT] (noting equivalence of these terms). 
10. See Jorge L. Contreras, Origins of FRAND Licensing Commitments in the United States and 
Europe, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 149. 
11. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120. 
12. AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: DUE PROCESS 
REQUIREMENTS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS § 3.1.1, 10–11 (2019) [hereinafter ANSI 
Essential Requirements] (an SDO must conform to the ANSI Essential Requirements in order to be 
recognized as a developer of American National Standards; these requirements include a patent policy 
that requires either royalty-free or FRAND licensing of essential patent claims). 
13. See Baron & Pohlmann, supra note 7, at 521 tbl.7; RUDI BEKKERS & ANDREW UPDEGROVE, A 
STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF STANDARDS SETTING 
ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE 89 tbl.13 (2012), http://sites.nationalacademies.org/xpedio/groups/ 
pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_072197.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML2N-ZFFJ] (noting that of ten 
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But despite the widespread imposition of FRAND commitments by 
SDOs, there is little consensus regarding the methodology for determining 
what royalty rates should be considered “fair” and “reasonable” in any 
given instance.14 No SDO defines, even broadly, how to calculate royalty 
rates that are FRAND,15 and many SDOs expressly disclaim any role in 
establishing, interpreting, or adjudicating FRAND royalty rates.16 Though 
some commentators (including the author) have argued that SDOs can and 
should play a greater role in defining the nature and scope of their FRAND 
commitments,17 concerns arising from antitrust law, complexity, 
                                                     
major SDOs studied, eight explicitly specify FRAND licensing as an option in their IPR policies); 
Brad Biddle et al., How Many Standards in a Laptop? (And Other Empirical Questions), in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2010 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION SEC. TELECOMM. STANDARDIZATION, 
KALEIDOSCOPE ACAD. CONF. 123 & fig.2 (75% of the laptop computer standards studied were subject 
to a RAND commitment and 22% were royalty-free); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights 
and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1906 (2002) (finding that of thirty-six 
SDO patent policies, twenty-nine required, and three encouraged, FRAND licensing).  
14. See, e.g., FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES 
WITH COMPETITION 192 (2011) (“[T]he terms RAND and FRAND are vague and ill-defined.”); 
Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting Organizations, 77 
ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 859 (2011) (noting that the “fair and reasonable” component of FRAND is 
“often inherently ambiguous”); Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Standard Setting Organizations Can Help Solve 
the Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 3 ( 2013) (“SSOs 
typically specify very little as to the meaning of ‘fair’ or ‘reasonable.’”); Doug Lichtman, 
Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1031 (2010) (“It is something of an 
outrage that the language of the RAND commitment offers so little guidance as to its proper 
interpretation.”); Joseph S. Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing 
and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 357 (2007) (reviewing earlier literature). 
15. One SDO—the IEEE Standards Association—has attempted to offer some high-level 
parameters for determining what rates satisfy its FRAND commitment. See IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, 
IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS § 6 (2016), http://standards.ieee.org/ 
develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9TC-QQ93] [hereinafter IEEE Policy]. 
Nevertheless, even this relatively modest effort at clarification has generated significant criticism and 
pushback. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents, 
104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 48, 67–72 (2015). 
16. See, e.g., IEEE Policy, supra note 15, at § 6.2 (“The IEEE is not responsible for . . . determining 
whether any licensing terms or conditions . . . are reasonable or non-discriminatory.”); SCOTT O. 
BRADNER & JORGE L. CONTRERAS, INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN IETF TECHNOLOGY 9 (2017) (“[IETF] will not make any explicit determination 
that the assurance of reasonable and non-discriminatory terms or any other terms . . . has been fulfilled 
in practice.”). 
17. See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen, Why Royalties for Standard Essential Patents Should Not Be Set 
by the Courts, 15 CHI-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 19 (2016) (arguing that SDOs, rather than courts, are 
best-equipped to make FRAND royalty determinations); Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A 
Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 78–87 (2013) 
[hereinafter Contreras, Fixing FRAND] (proposing mechanism for SDO determination of FRAND 
royalty rates); Jorge L. Contreras, Aggregated Royalties for Top-Down FRAND Determinations: 
Revisiting ‘Joint Negotiation’, 62 ANTITRUST BULL. 690 (2017) [hereinafter Contreras, Aggregated 
Royalties] (proposing collective negotiation of aggregate royalty rates within SDOs); Kühn et al., 
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efficiency, cost, and member pressure have led some SDOs to prohibit 
outright any discussion of royalties and other licensing terms at SDO-
sponsored activities.18 
With little guidance from SDOs and regulatory authorities, SEP holders 
and manufacturers of standardized products are left to determine FRAND 
royalty rates in private negotiations. But given the complexity of these 
transactions, the large sums at stake, and the legal uncertainty that 
pervades this area, an increasing number of disputes have arisen regarding 
the appropriate level of FRAND royalty rates. It is now routine for 
manufacturers of standardized products to claim that SEP holders seek 
royalties that are in excess of FRAND limits and are thereby violating 
their FRAND commitments. By the same token, it has become 
commonplace for SEP holders to claim that manufacturers are dragging 
their feet in negotiations, intentionally stalling so as to avoid paying 
royalties that are fair and reasonable (a practice referred to as “holdout” 
or “reverse hold-up”). In both types of cases, courts around the world have 
been called upon to adjudicate the level of royalties that SEP holders can 
validly charge.19 Not surprisingly, these disputes are costly, unpredictable, 
and disruptive to the market. 
The above considerations can be distilled into three key deficiencies 
that most significantly impact the efficient and predictable determination 
of FRAND royalty rates, both privately and through adjudication: lack of 
transparency, lack of consistency, and lack of comprehensiveness. 
Transparency. FRAND royalty rates must, by their terms, be non-
discriminatory, meaning that, at least with respect to similarly-situated 
licensees, rates should be comparable if not identical.20 But because 
FRAND royalty negotiations and the resulting license agreements are 
typically subject to strict confidentiality obligations, manufacturers have 
                                                     
supra note 14, at 3 (“SSOs can substantially reduce the problem of hold-up and litigation in this sector 
by reforming their IPR policies.”). 
18. See, e.g., IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N., IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD OPERATIONS MANUAL 
§ 5.3.10.2 (2015) (“No discussions or other communications regarding the following topics shall 
occur during . . . duly authorized IEEE-SA standards-development technical activities: . . . the 
essentiality, interpretation, or validity of patent claims; specific patent license terms or other 
intellectual property rights . . . .”); see also Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 17, at 51–52 
(discussing reasons for prohibitions); Lemley, supra note 13, at 1965 (observing that such restrictions 
are often intended to shield SDOs from antitrust liability). 
19. See generally CHRYSSOULA PENTHEROUDAKIS & JUSTUS A. BARON, LICENSING TERMS OF 
STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF CASES, JRC Science for Policy 
Report EUR 28302 (Nikolaus Thumm ed., 2017) (cataloging FRAND litigation around the world).  
20. See infra notes 97–99 and accompanying discussion of non-discrimination requirements. 
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little visibility into the rates offered by SEP holders to others.21 Likewise, 
when parties resolve their FRAND disputes through binding arbitration, 
the results are typically not disclosed to the public.22 Accordingly, aside 
from a few published judicial opinions, there is a paucity of publicly 
available information regarding FRAND royalty rates.23 Thus, 
manufacturers have few means short of litigation discovery by which they 
can compare a SEP holder’s royalty rates or validate whether a SEP holder 
has complied with its obligation to grant licenses on non-discriminatory 
terms.24 
Consistency. Parties ordering their affairs depend on consistent rulings 
and legal interpretations from courts, and such consistency is particularly 
important when significant investments and business decisions will 
depend on a party’s assessment of its legal rights.25 But as the number of 
courts deciding FRAND-related cases has increased, so has disagreement 
over the interpretation of FRAND commitments.26 And nowhere is this 
disagreement more pronounced than in the methodology for computing 
FRAND royalties. As discussed in Section I.A, there are more than a 
dozen points of serious divergence among courts and other adjudicatory 
                                                     
21. See Mark R. Patterson, Confidentiality in Patent Dispute Resolution: Antitrust Implications, 93 
WASH. L. REV. 827 (2018) (raising antitrust concerns arising from lack of transparency in FRAND 
licensing transactions). 
22. See Jorge L. Contreras & David L. Newman, Developing a Framework for Arbitrating 
Standards-Essential Patent Disputes, 2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 23, 39–41 (discussing confidentiality in 
FRAND arbitration); Yoonhee Kim, Lifting Confidentiality of FRAND Royalties in SEP Arbitration, 
16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
23. See generally JORGE L. CONTRERAS ET AL., STUDY PROPOSAL—COMMERCIAL PATENT 
LICENSING DATA (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755706 
[https://perma.cc/WL7H-L6NS] (identifying lack of public licensing data as an issue both for firms 
and courts). 
24. Cf. Gilbert, supra note 14, at 870 (underscoring the importance of non-discrimination 
commitments to the correct functioning of FRAND obligations). 
25. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical 
Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1479 (2009) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, New York] (discussing parties’ 
preference for “certainty and predictability” in transactions). 
26. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Private Law, Conflict Of Laws, and a Lex Mercatoria of 
Standards-Development Organizations, 2019 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 245, 253 (2019) [hereinafter 
Contreras, Lex Mercatoria] (“The application of specific national laws and modes of legal 
interpretation to already complex and lengthy SDO policies has introduced an additional level of 
unpredictability and uncertainty to the interpretation of SDO policies, particularly surrounding 
FRAND commitments.”); Jyh-An Lee & Dicky Tsang, Unfriendly Choice of Law in FRAND 
(working paper, presented at IP Scholars Conference, Aug. 2018) (noting national inconsistencies in 
interpretation of FRAND commitments among courts in the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, 
Korea, China and Germany); PENTHEROUDAKIS & BARON, supra note 19 (cataloging issues and 
disputes in cases around the world). 
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bodies with respect to the methods of calculating FRAND royalty rates. 
These methods can vary dramatically from court to court and case to case, 
even for patents covering the same standard and for cases within the same 
jurisdiction.27 This degree of judicial discord, coupled with the lack of 
transparency noted above, creates uncertainty in the marketplace, as there 
is no definitive benchmark that parties can use to determine whether the 
rates being offered in private negotiations are reasonable or not. What is 
more, as discussed in Section I.C, national courts have become 
increasingly emboldened to determine FRAND rates at a global level.28 
Thus, the methodological choices made by any given court take on even 
greater significance, as they may be applied not only by the court hearing 
a dispute but also around the world. 
Comprehensiveness. As noted above, many widely adopted standards 
are covered by hundreds or thousands of patents.29 Yet in litigation, the 
royalty due to every patent holder is determined individually, without 
reference to the other patents covering the same standard or product. In 
most cases, only one patent holder out of dozens presents arguments to 
the court, generally over emphasizing the value of its own patents above 
the others.30 Thus, even if such a royalty might meet some test of 
                                                     
27. See Ryan Davis, 4 Things to Know About the Latest FRAND Rate-Setting Case, LAW360 (Jan. 
4, 2018, 9:36 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/998063/4-things-to-know-about-the-latest-
frand-rate-setting-case [http://perma.cc/M8K4-4JS9] (quoting attorney David Long, who noted “[w]e 
haven’t had any U.S. court consistently apply the same method”); Jason R. Bartlett & Jorge L. 
Contreras, Rationalizing FRAND Royalties: Can Interpleader Save the Internet of Things, 36 REV. 
LITIG. 285, 296 (2017) (discussing inconsistency in judicial determinations of FRAND royalties for 
patents covering Wi-Fi standard). See generally Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, The New 
Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the Laws of International Commercial Transactions, 2 B.U. 
INT’L L.J. 317, 326 (1984) (noting the general tendency of national courts to interpret the same 
contractual provisions in different ways). 
28. Recent cases in which courts have sought to determine FRAND rates at a global level include 
Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 (Apr. 5, 2017), aff’d 
[2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 (Oct. 23, 2018) (Eng.), and TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Nos. SACV 14–341 JVS(DFMx), CV 15–2370 JVS(DFMx), 2017 
WL 6611635 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017).  
29. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
30. See William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 
101 CORNELL L. REV. 385, 427 (2016) (“When thousands of patents or other inputs are involved in 
the same device, judges and juries consistently and systematically overemphasize the value of the 
single patent (or patents) at issue as compared to all the other inputs.”); Bartlett & Contreras, supra 
note 27, at 304–05 (comparing judicial tendency to view all patents as “above average” to Garrison 
Keillor’s Lake Wobegon, “where all the women are strong, all the men are good looking, and all the 
children are above average” (quoting The News from Lake Wobegon, A Prairie Home Companion 
(1974–2016))); Bernard Chao & Roderick O’Dorisio, Saliency, Anchors, and Frames: A 
Multicomponent Damages Experiment 1 (U. of Denv. Sturm Coll. of Law. Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 19-03, 2018) (finding that fact finders tend to over-value the first plaintiff to trial 
when apportioning damages among multiple patent holders). 
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reasonableness if considered in isolation, it is not likely to be reasonable 
when combined with many other independently-calculated royalties 
applied to the same product. This is the well-known issue of royalty 
“stacking”.31 In reality, despite the inherently bilateral, adversarial nature 
of litigation, the determination of a FRAND royalty is not strictly a 
bilateral matter. Rather, it must involve consideration of the other patented 
and unpatented technologies embodied in the standardized technology, as 
the royalty determination made in one case necessarily affects the level of 
royalties in many other cases. Thus, FRAND royalty determinations, 
particularly when they relate to standards covered by diversified patent 
holdings, should be comprehensive, taking into account the totality of 
patents and technologies involved in the relevant standard or product.32 
These three deficiencies in the FRAND licensing system—
transparency, consistency, and comprehensiveness—impact the market in 
two principal ways. First, they negatively affect the overall fairness and 
accuracy of the system by producing results that could favor some market 
participants over others in a manner that arguably violates the express 
commitment to grant licenses on terms that are FRAND. Uncertainty 
regarding the level of FRAND royalty rates makes it more difficult for 
manufacturers to predict the cost of entering a market characterized by 
broad product interoperability. 
Second, the system imposes excess transaction costs through 
duplicative negotiation and litigation both among different parties 
disputing rates over the same patents and among the same parties 
litigating in different jurisdictions. As reported in recent cases, 
negotiations over FRAND licenses routinely take years and often result in 
an impasse that can be resolved only through litigation.33 Such transaction 
costs could deter or prevent small and medium enterprises (SMEs) from 
entering the market and increase costs for larger firms, which in turn could 
lead to reduced consumer choice and higher consumer prices. The result 
                                                     
31. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“If companies are 
forced to pay royalties to all [patent] holders, the royalties will ‘stack’ on top of each other and may 
become excessive in the aggregate.”). 
32. In addition, separate judicial proceedings addressing similar legal and factual issues are 
inherently inefficient, as each judge in each case must separately be educated about the relevant 
industry, technology, commitments and valuation methodologies. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting 
into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1293, 1317 (1996) (observing high transaction costs involved in judicial determination of 
copyright licensing rates). 
33. See, e.g., Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 2017 WL 6611635 (discussing in the Memorandum 
of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law how negotiations over 3G/4G patent license took over 
six years and ultimately ended in litigation). 
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could undermine the benefits that industry-wide, non-discriminatory 
licensing of SEPs is intended to achieve. These concerns are particularly 
worthy of attention today given the advent of important new technologies, 
such as broadband 5G/6G data transmission and the Internet of Things 
that will be heavily dependent on standardization.34 
This Article adopts the perspective of a social planner seeking to 
minimize unfairness/inaccuracy and administrative inefficiency in 
FRAND licensing so as to maximize overall social welfare. As such, the 
proposals made herein are not aimed either at achieving any particular 
distribution of revenue between SEP holders and manufacturers of 
standardized products or at minimizing consumer prices. Instead, it has 
the relatively modest aspiration of reducing unnecessary transaction costs 
while ensuring the fair and consistent treatment of all parties.35 
To do so, the tripartite issues of transparency, consistency, and 
comprehensiveness in the FRAND licensing system must be addressed. 
That is, an open and transparent process should be used both to ensure 
that SEP holders are treating licensees in a non-discriminatory fashion and 
to provide reliable cost information to potential market entrants. FRAND 
rates should be determined in a consistent manner, at least for all patents 
covering a particular standard, but preferably for all standards generally. 
And finally, the determination of FRAND royalties should be 
comprehensive, taking into account all pertinent information regarding 
the patents covering the relevant standard and not just the patents that may 
be held by a party to a particular lawsuit. 
Over the past decade, proposals for increasing transparency in 
standard-setting have included, among others, requirements that SEP 
holders disclose their licensing rates prior to adoption of a standard (so-
called ex ante disclosure),36 a requirement that SEP holders offer a simple 
                                                     
34. See EUR. COMM’N, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE: SETTING OUT 
THE EU APPROACH TO STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS 2 (2017) [hereinafter EC SEP COMMC’N]; 
Fiona S. Morton & Carl Shapiro, Patent Assertions: Are We Any Closer to Aligning Reward to 
Contribution? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21678, 2015). 
35. This balance is important. Simply minimizing transaction costs could be achieved, for example, 
by requiring that all SEPs be licensed at zero royalty rates. In fact, a number of SDOs have adopted 
precisely such policies. See Jorge L. Contreras, A Tale of Two Layers: Patents, Standards and the 
Internet, 93 DENVER L. REV. 855 (2016) (discussing royalty-free licensing policies at IETF and W3C 
and contrasting with SDOs adopting FRAND policies). Yet “one size does not fit all,” and in some 
technology areas a royalty-free licensing regime might not produce desired levels of innovation and 
technology contribution. Thus, FRAND licensing cannot be ruled out entirely. 
36. PIERRE RÉGIBEAU ET AL., TRANSPARENCY, PREDICTABILITY, AND EFFICIENCY OF SSO-BASED 
STANDARDIZATION AND SEP LICENSING: A REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 31, 46 (2016); 
Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an 
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“cash only” price for licensing their SEPs,37 greater verification of the 
essentiality of patents declared to be SEPs,38 and increasing available 
public information about disclosures made to SDOs.39 But none of these 
proposals has been adopted by any major SDOs. Likewise, some courts 
have taken steps toward addressing the issue of comprehensiveness. 
Specifically, a number of courts have used so-called “top down” 
approaches to FRAND royalty calculation in which an aggregate royalty 
for all patents covering a particular standard is first determined and then 
allocated among individual patent holders. This approach, which is 
discussed in greater detail in Section I.A and for which the author has 
advocated,40 is an important step toward addressing comprehensiveness 
issues in FRAND rate determination but does not solve the problems of 
lack of transparency or consistency. Thus, in order to address the most 
challenging issues facing the standardization system today, a tripartite 
approach that simultaneously improves transparency, consistency, and 
comprehensiveness together is needed. 
In prior work, the author has proposed that these goals may be achieved 
through the procedural litigation mechanism of interpleader to aggregate 
all claims pertaining to royalties on a single standard into a single, massive 
judicial proceeding.41 The author has also proposed that SDOs could 
achieve these goals through private ordering, by facilitating an open 
agreement among SEP holders and manufacturers on aggregate royalty 
                                                     
Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS 163 (2013) [hereinafter Contreras, Ex Ante] (describing ex ante 
policies adopted and proposed at several SDOs). 
37. ALBERT A. FOER & SANDEEP VAHEESAN, REQUEST FOR JOINT ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES ON THE 
PATENT POLICIES OF STANDARD SETTING ORGANIZATIONS: PETITION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 16–17 (May 23, 2013), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/Request-for-Joint-Enforcement-Guidelines-on-the-Patent-Policies-of-Standard-
Setting-Organizations.pdf [https://perma.cc/PS9P-YXLR] (“Licensees should have the option of licensing 
individual SEPs on a cash-only basis.”); Kühn et al., supra note 14, at 4 (“The F/RAND dispute resolution 
process should require that the licensor specify a cash price for its SEPs as an alternative to other pricing 
arrangements to aid in evaluation of the proposed license terms by the third party.”). 
38. EC SEP COMMC’N, supra note 34, at 7 (observing that SDOs make no validation of SEP 
declarations, potentially leading to over-declaration); RÉGIBEAU ET AL., supra note 36, at 32, 62, 86 
(noting the significant problem of “over-declaration” of SEPs). 
39. EC SEP COMMC’N, supra note 34, at 3; RÉGIBEAU ET AL., supra note 36, at 32, 62, 86; NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 80 
(Keith Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2013) [hereinafter NRC REPORT] (“SSOs should to [sic] 
consider measures to increase the quality and accuracy of disclosure data.”). 
40. See Contreras, Aggregate Royalties, supra note 17. 
41. Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 27 (proposing judicial interpleader process for resolving 
multiparty FRAND royalty determinations). 
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rates for particular standards.42 Other commentators have likewise made 
a range of reasonable proposals seeking to address these issues with the 
current FRAND licensing system.43 Even the leaders of the largest patent 
offices in the world have made calls for greater consistency in addressing 
SEP disputes.44 Yet it does not appear that a critical mass of SDOs and 
SDO participants are ready to implement any of these proposals.45 
Commercial ventures, too, have sought to solve these problems through 
the pooling of patents essential to key standards, yet these efforts have 
either failed or have not yet attracted significant market participation.46 
This Article offers a new option for determining FRAND royalty rates 
in a transparent, consistent, and comprehensive manner: the establishment 
of a non-governmental, global FRAND rate-setting tribunal (referred to 
herein as the “FRAND Tribunal”).47 Such a tribunal could contribute to 
alleviating the uncertainty and litigation burden currently associated with 
FRAND licensing. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds in four principal parts. Part I 
summarizes current disputes regarding the calculation of FRAND 
royalties, both in the literature and in judicial determinations, and 
highlights how the divergent approaches taken by courts in resolving these 
disputes has led to significant inconsistency in this area. Part I concludes 
                                                     
42. See Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 17 (proposing SDO-based “pseudo-pool” approach 
to setting aggregate FRAND royalty rates); see also Contreras, Aggregated Royalties, supra note 17 
(refining earlier proposal). 
43. See, e.g., Kühn et al., supra note 14, at 3–5 (proposing various IPR policies to be implemented 
by SSOs to limit patent holdup); Mark Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards 
(and One Not to), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 155–67 (2008) [hereinafter Lemley, Ten Things] (suggesting 
five steps for SSOs to take and five changes to the law that could prevent patent holdup); Marc 
Rysman & Timothy Simcoe, A NAASTy Alternative to RAND Pricing Commitments, 35 TELECOM. 
POL’Y 1010, 1014–15 (2011) (proposing to replace RAND policies with a policy of Non-Assertion 
After Specified Time (NAAST)).  
44. See Brian Yap, European Patent Official Says Disputes Need Multilateral Solutions, 95 
PATENT TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 12 (2018). 
45. For a discussion of commercial factors that have stymied policy change in this area, see 
Contreras, Ex Ante, supra note 36, at 206–08 (considering rationales for failure of SDOs to adopt ex 
ante disclosure policies). 
46. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1042 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing 
unsuccessful VIA licensing pool for Wi-Fi patents); Jorge L. Contreras, FRAND Market Failure: 
IPXI’s Standards-Essential Patent License Exchange, 15 CHI-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 419 (2016) 
(describing IPXI, an effort to pool and securitize license rights for the Wi-Fi standard); How it Works: 
Marketplace, AVANCI, http://avanci.com/marketplace/ [https://perma.cc/8L24-CN4J] (describing 
pooled licensing of wireless WLAN SEPs for industries such as automotive). 
47. The instant proposal is not simply to submit FRAND disputes to binding bilateral arbitration. 
The use of arbitration to resolve FRAND disputes has been proposed before. See infra Section II.A. 
Rather, this Article proposes a framework and tribunal for resolving FRAND disputes on a global 
multilateral basis, involving all interested parties: rate-setting rather than bilateral arbitration. 
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with a discussion of the international “race to the bottom” that could 
emerge as national courts increasingly determine FRAND royalty rates on 
a global basis. Part II describes a range of antecedents for the proposed 
rate-setting mechanism, including other arbitral bodies and rate-setting 
tribunals, as well as initial efforts made to resolve FRAND disputes 
through alternative dispute resolution. Part III introduces the proposed 
FRAND rate-setting tribunal and summarizes its principal features. 
I. FRAND ROYALTIES TODAY 
There are numerous areas of disagreement regarding the calculation of 
FRAND royalties among litigants and courts around the world. First, 
Section I.A discusses two different fundamental approaches to calculating 
an appropriate FRAND royalties. Second, Section I.B describes additional 
factors with different interpretations. Section I.C analyses additional 
complications in setting worldwide royalty rates. As observed by the 
English Court of Appeals in its characteristically understated manner, “the 
approaches of courts around the world to the assessment of royalties under 
a worldwide [FRAND] licence are not at present wholly aligned.”48 To 
illustrate the current degree of intra-jurisdictional discord, this Part 
describes some of the judicial disagreements over FRAND royalty 
calculation in greater detail.49 
A. FRAND Rate Calculation Approaches: Top-Down Versus Bottom-
Up 
Generally speaking, courts have adopted two fundamental approaches 
to calculating the FRAND royalty to be charged by a SEP holder to the 
manufacturer of a standardized product. Under a “bottom up” approach, 
the FRAND royalty is determined using a conventional “reasonable 
royalty” patent damages analysis in which the value of the SEP holder’s 
patents is assessed independently of other patents that may cover the 
infringing product, and the total royalty burden on the relevant standard 
and product emerge only as the sum of its individual components in 
separate cases. In contrast, under a “top down” approach, the aggregate 
royalty for all SEPs covering a particular standard is first calculated, after 
which an appropriate portion is allocated to the claiming SEP holder. Each 
of these approaches is discussed in greater detail below. 
                                                     
48. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd. [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 ¶ 83. 
49. The discussion in this Section is not intended to be comprehensive but only to provide several 
examples of current disagreements over FRAND royalty calculation around the world. For a more 
comprehensive discussion, see Contreras, Global Standards Wars, supra note 1 and 
PENTHEROUDAKIS & BARON, supra note 19. 
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1. Bottom-Up Approach 
Bottom-up royalty calculations are derived from traditional patent 
damages analysis. In the United States, a patent holder asserting patents 
against an infringer is entitled to prove the value of its patents in order to 
establish “reasonable royalty” damages.50 For the past several decades, 
the calculation of reasonable royalty damages in the United States has 
generally followed the fifteen-factor framework established in Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.51 The factors contributing to the 
reasonable royalty calculation under Georgia-Pacific include the rates 
paid by the licensee for similar patents, whether the license is exclusive 
or non-exclusive, whether the licensor has a policy of limiting the 
licensing of its patents, the rates charged by the licensor to other licensees 
of the same patents (“comparable” licenses), the competitive relationship 
between licensor and licensee, and the opinions of qualified experts.52 
However, because the Georgia-Pacific framework assumes that a 
patent holder and an alleged infringer have no pre-existing relationship or 
duty toward one another, many of the factors considered in this analysis 
are inapplicable to cases involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs, in which 
the SEP holder has an affirmative obligation to grant licenses to 
implementers of the standard. Accordingly, in Microsoft Corp. v. 
Motorola, Inc.,53 the district court expressly modified twelve of the fifteen 
Georgia-Pacific factors to align them more closely with the relationship 
between a SEP holder and the manufacturer of a standardized product.54 
Likewise, in Ericsson v. D-Link,55 the Federal Circuit recognized several 
instances in which the Georgia-Pacific factors were both irrelevant and 
inconsistent with the relationship between parties operating under a 
FRAND commitment.56 It thus approved the lower court’s modification 
                                                     
50. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018) (“[T]he court shall award the claimant damages adequate to 
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use the infringer 
made of the invention.”). 
51. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and aff’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971). 
52. Id. 
53. No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *16–17 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). 
54. Id. at *57–65 (modifying Georgia-Pacific factors 1, 4–13, 15); see also Norman V. Siebrasse 
& Thomas F. Cotter, Judicially Determined FRAND Royalties, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK, supra 
note 6, at 365; Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND and other 
Reasonable Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1447, 1483–85 (2015) (analyzing court’s reasoning). 
55. 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
56. Id. at 1229–30 (criticizing district court’s use of Georgia-Pacific factors 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10). For 
a more detailed analysis of the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in this regard, see J. Gregory Sidak, 
Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, And Comparable Licenses after Ericsson v. D-Link, 2016 U. ILL. 
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of these factors, but declined to require any particular modifications in 
other cases involving FRAND commitments, leaving lower courts and, 
potentially, juries to make these assessments on a case-by-case basis. 
The incremental nature of judicial decision making has led to a 
significant degree of divergence in FRAND royalty rate determinations, 
even when patents covering the same features of the same standard are at 
issue. For example, between 2013 and 2014 five different U.S. district 
courts calculated royalties for a total of thirty-five SEPs covering Wi-Fi 
standards, each using a slightly different methodology.57 The aggregate 
royalty for these thirty-five patents amounted to approximately 4.5% of 
the total sale price of a typical $50 Wi-Fi router.58 Yet it has been 
estimated that there are approximately 3,000 patents covering the Wi-Fi 
standard,59 nearly one hundred times the number subject to adjudication. 
Were the royalty for each of these patents to be calculated in a similarly 
uncoordinated, bottom-up manner, the aggregate patent royalty on a Wi-
Fi router could easily surpass the product’s total selling price by at least 
an order of magnitude. This is a prime example of how inconsistent and 
non-comprehensive bottom-up approaches to FRAND royalty calculation 
can lead to royalty stacking.60 
2. Top-Down Approach 
Given the shortcomings of bottom-up FRAND royalty calculations and 
the threat of royalty stacking when multiple firms hold SEPs covering a 
single standard,61 commentators, courts, and policy makers have become 
increasingly attracted to mechanisms that take into account the aggregate 
                                                     
L. REV. 1809, 1854–62 (critiquing Federal Circuit reasoning); Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 54, at 
374; Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 54, at 1485–86. 
57. Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 27, at 296 tbl.2. 
58. Id. 
59. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061, 
at *179–80 (N.D. Ill. Sept 27, 2013) (“[T]he court determines that the PA Report’s number of 
approximately 3000 is a credible account of the number of potentially standard-essential patents.”). 
60. See supra note 31. Some authors have observed that significant royalty stacking does not appear 
to have occurred in practice in some industries characterized by the presence of large numbers of 
SEPs. See, e.g., Jonathan Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1313, 1356–61 (2017); Alexander Galetovic et al., Is There an Anticommons Tragedy in the 
World Smartphone Industry?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1527 (2017). These scholars offer several 
possible reasons that royalty stacking has not manifested itself in these industries, a full discussion of 
which is beyond the scope of this Article. However, suffice it to say that the theoretical threat of 
stacking remains and is likely enhanced in new technology markets such as the Internet of Things 
(IoT) in which an increasing number of market entrants participate. 
61. See, e.g., Baron & Pohlmann, supra note 7 (upwards of sixty different firms have declared 
patents essential to widely adopted wireless telecommunications standards). 
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royalty burden associated with a standard when considering the royalties 
owed to any particular patent holder. Thus, as the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois explained in In re Innovatio IP Ventures,62 
“the determination of a [F]RAND royalty must address the risk of royalty 
stacking by considering the aggregate royalties that would apply if other 
[SEP] holders made royalty demands of the implementer.”63 The 
European Commission echoed this sentiment in its 2017 Communication 
on SEPs, stating that “an individual SEP cannot be considered in isolation. 
Parties need to take into account a reasonable aggregate rate for the 
standard, assessing the overall added value of the technology.”64 
Royalty calculation methodologies that take into account aggregate 
royalty levels can broadly be termed “top-down” approaches because they 
look first to the overall level of royalties associated with a standard and 
then allocate a portion of the total to individual SEP holders. Top-down 
approaches implicitly recognize that when multiple patents cover a single 
standard, the rate charged by one SEP holder will necessarily affect the 
rates that the other SEP holders can charge a single manufacturer.65 
Several courts around the world have attempted to determine FRAND 
royalty rates using a top-down methodology, including the court in 
Innovatio, the Japanese Intellectual Property High Court in Samsung v. 
Apple Japan,66 the U.K. High Court of Justice (Patents) in 
Unwired Planet v. Huawei,67 and the U.S. District Court for the Central 
District of California in TCL Communications v. Ericsson.68 In each of 
these cases, the court first sought to determine the aggregate royalty rate 
that should be attributed to all patents covering a particular standard and 
then allocated an appropriate portion to the SEPs in suit.69 The court in 
TCL v. Ericsson identifies the following merits of a top-down approach: 
                                                     
62. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061 (N.D. Ill. Sept 27, 2013). 
63. Id. at *66 (internal quotes omitted). 
64. EC SEP COMMC’N, supra note 34, at 7.  
65. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1991, 2011 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup] (“[T]he royalty rate negotiated by 
one patent holder is affected by the rates the downstream firm pays to other patent holders, so a proper 
analysis must account for the joint determination of all the royalty rates.”). 
66. Chiteki Zaisan Koto Saibansho [Intellectual Prop. High Ct.] May 16, 2014, 2013 (Ne) 10043 
(Japan). 
67. [2017] EWHC (Ch) 711 (Pat) (Apr. 5, 2017), aff’d [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 (Oct. 23, 2018) 
(Eng.). 
68. Nos. SACV 14–341 JVS(DFMx), CV 15–2370 JVS(DFMx), 2017 WL 6611635 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 21, 2017). 
69. For a more detailed discussion of the use of top-down approaches in these cases, see Contreras, 
Aggregate Royalties, supra note 17. 
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While this approach is not perfect, it has merit because: (1) it 
relies on statements that Ericsson and other SEP owners made to 
induce people to adopt and invest in each standard when the risk 
of hold-up was low; (2) these statements were made before the 
standard was adopted, providing the SEP owners with incentive 
to be reasonable with their overall expectations and greatly 
reducing the risk of hold-up and royalty stacking; (3) Ericsson 
was a licensor and licensee, giving it stronger incentive to be fair 
and reasonable with its own estimate; (4) Ericsson still stands by 
this methodology . . . ; and (5) it at least provides the ceiling for a 
FRAND rate, because increasing the royalty rate after the 
standard has been adopted, without showing that the increase is 
due to additions to the standard, is the definition of hold-up. Use 
of an aggregate figure in fact hews to the principle of setting rates 
to reflect Ericsson’s own estimate of the total value the licensed 
technology contributed to the product.70 
But despite the appeal of top-down FRAND royalty calculation 
methodologies, reliable and consistent methods for determining the 
aggregate royalty burden on a particular standard have proven difficult to 
implement. A principal reason is the lack of transparency in FRAND 
transactions, which prevents any given licensee from knowing precisely 
what terms a SEP holder has offered to other licensees and which prevents 
courts from learning the rates charged by SEP holders that are not before 
them in a particular matter.71 Faced with this challenge, courts using top-
down methodologies have been forced to rely upon less reliable data. For 
example, in three of the four cases mentioned above,72 the court utilized a 
combination of public statements by SEP holders and other industry 
participants coupled with other market factors to determine the aggregate 
royalty burden for a particular standard. In Unwired Planet, the court cited 
eight different press releases and public statements in which industry 
participants estimated either the total royalty burden for the relevant 
standards or their share of SEPs covering those standards.73 In some cases, 
                                                     
70. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd., at *14. 
71. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.  
72. See supra notes 66–68.  
73. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [264(i)–(vii)] 
(Apr. 5, 2017), aff’d [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 (Oct. 23, 2018). Similar statements were recently 
relied upon by the parties in TCL’s Redacted Trial Brief at 8, TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Nos. SACV 14-341 JVS (DFMx), CV 15-02370 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 
1, 2017) [hereinafter TCL Trial Brief]. 
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these rates were no more than ballpark estimates74 that the court found to 
be “obviously self-serving.”75 Similar evidence was utilized by the 
Japanese IP High Court in Samsung v. Apple Japan, which established an 
aggregate baseline royalty rate of 5% for a standard—a figure derived 
from public statements and informal agreements among industry 
participants.76 
This weakness in recent applications of the top-down approach to 
FRAND royalty calculation is compounded by the incremental nature of 
current FRAND litigation. Thus, just as with bottom-up approaches, 
courts adjudicating FRAND royalty rates are presented with evidence 
from only one SEP holder, rather than from the entire market, making it 
likely that their allocation of royalties to particular SEP holders will be 
inconsistent.77 Absent the introduction of multi-party litigation 
mechanisms such as interpleader,78 this incremental approach is an 
unavoidable feature of private litigation. This is one of the reasons that 
this Article proposes an alternative to conventional litigation for the 
determination of FRAND royalty rates. 
B. Other FRAND Rate Issues 
In addition to the choice between top-down and bottom-up royalty 
calculation methodologies, there are a number of additional controversies 
surrounding the calculation of FRAND royalties. For example, there is 
significant debate regarding the correct royalty “base” (the amount by 
which a percentage royalty is multiplied to derive the actual amount owed 
to the patent holder) for calculating FRAND royalties. Two competing 
approaches have emerged from the case law: the “smallest salable patent 
practicing unit” (SSPPU) approach, in which the royalty rate is multiplied 
by the sale price of the smallest infringing component that is sold as a 
                                                     
74. For example, in one public statement by “wireless industry leaders,” the maximum reasonable 
aggregate royalty level for the 4G LTE standard should be a “single-digit percentage of the sales 
price.” Unwired Planet [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [264(i)]. Another press release by Huawei 
anticipated “a low single-digit percentage of sales prices as a reasonable maximum aggregate royalty 
rate applicable to end-user devices.” Id. at ¶ 264(iii).  
75. Id. at ¶ 269.  
76. Apple Japan, 2013 (Ne) 10043 at 131 (with respect to particular products, the baseline rate was 
discounted by a factor corresponding to the value contributed by the standard to the product). 
77. See, e.g., Fei Deng et al., Comparative Analysis of Court-Determined FRAND Royalty Rates, 
32 ANTITRUST 47, 49 (2018) (comparing differing top-down methodologies in Unwired Planet [2017] 
EWHC (Pat) 711 [1] and TCL, Case No. SACV14-341 JVS, at 1). 
78. See Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 27. 
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stand-alone unit (e.g., a chip or module),79 and the “entire market value 
rule” (EMVR), in which the royalty is based on the value of the complete 
end product implementing the patented feature (e.g., a smart phone, 
computer, or game player).80 Assuming that the royalty rate remains 
constant, the choice between the SSPPU and the EMVR approaches could 
yield significantly different returns to the patent holder. There is now a 
growing literature debating the relative merits of these differing 
approaches to FRAND royalty calculation,81 and at least one major SDO 
has suggested that its participants consider SSPPU when negotiating 
FRAND royalty rates.82 
Another area of disagreement arises with respect to the use of 
comparable license agreements as evidence supporting the determination 
of FRAND royalty rates. Some commentators support the use of 
comparable licenses as the best available evidence of royalty rates that the 
parties would have agreed to in a hypothetical negotiation.83 Courts have 
likewise taken differing approaches to the comparable license agreements 
that will be admitted into evidence when calculating FRAND royalty 
rates, ranging from the admission of licenses with different parties and 
patent pools84 to licenses granted solely by the SEP holder in suit under 
the same patent portfolio.85 
Another contentious issue arises when a portion of the total value of an 
infringing product is apportioned to a particular patent holder and the 
product is covered by multiple patents. It is well-established that 
                                                     
79. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 698 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (first 
enunciating the SSPPU test). 
80. See Ericsson v. D-Link, 773 F.3d 1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (comparing EMVR and SSPPU 
approaches in SEP cases). 
81. See David Kappos & Paul R. Michel, The Smallest Salable Patent-Practicing Unit: 
Observations on its Origins, Development, and Future, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1433 (2017); 
Nicolas Petit, The Smallest Salable Patent-Practicing Unit Experiment, General Purpose 
Technologies and the Coase Theorem, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (2017); J. Gregory Sidak, The Proper 
Royalty Base for Patent Damages, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 989 (2014); Siebrasse & Cotter, 
supra note 54, at 375–77. 
82. See IEEE Policy, supra note 15, at § 6.1; Business Review Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting 
Assistant Att’y Gen. to Michael L. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Feb. 2, 2015) (approving 
IEEE policy amendments). 
83. See Damien Geradin & Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Value Apportionment Rules for Complex, 
Multi-Patent Products, 27 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 763 (2011); Sidak, supra note 
56; Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, SEP Royalties: What Theory of Value and Distribution 
Should Courts Apply? (Hoover Inst. Working Group, Working Paper No. 19001, 2019). 
84. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1042–45 (9th Cir. 2015). 
85. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [1]; see also Deng et 
al., supra note 77, at 48 (comparing differing methodologies used to assess comparable licenses in 
Unwired Planet v. Huawei and TCL v. Ericsson). 
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“reasonable royalty” patent damages should be “based on the incremental 
value that the patented invention adds to the end product.”86 Determining 
this incremental value requires a court to determine the fraction of the 
overall product value that is contributed by the patented feature in view 
of all the other patented and unpatented features of the product. This 
analysis is often referred to as “apportionment.”87 Aside from the 
difficulty of determining the overall value that a standard contributes to a 
particular product, the court must also determine how valuable one patent 
covering a standard is in comparison to the others. Individual patents and 
groups of patents have been valued in litigation using a range of methods 
including citation count, cost recovery, real option value, discounted cash 
flow, and comparison to comparable licenses.88 But in many cases where 
multiple patents cover a single standard or product, royalties are allocated 
on the basis of one-patent-one-share (sometimes referred to as numerical 
proportionality).89 While this last approach may seem unsophisticated in 
comparison to those better informed by economic analysis, it is frequently 
adopted by parties and courts during litigation. As explained by the lower 
court in Unwired Planet, “some sort of patent counting is the only 
practical approach at least for a portfolio of any size. Trying to evaluate 
the importance of individual inventions becomes disproportionate very 
quickly.”90 
                                                     
86. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
87. See id. at 1226–28. 
88. See RICHARD RAZGAITIS, VALUATION AND PRICING OF TECHNOLOGY-BASED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 41–54 (2003); Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 27, at 308–09 (collecting literature); 
Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Damages Heuristics, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 175 n.52 (2018) 
(analyzing various methodologies adopted in recent SEP cases); Geradin & Layne-Farrar, supra note 
83, at 781–84; Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031, 1059 (2005); J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive 
Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714, 736–43 (2008); 
Patrick H. Sullivan, Standardising IP Valuations: Whether, What and How, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., 
Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 30 (noting that over fifty different methods for valuing IP are currently in use); 
David O. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. REV. 79, 131–
39 (2014); Robert Pitkethly, The Valuation of Patents: A Review of Patent Valuation Methods with 
Consideration of Option Based Methods and the Potential for Further Research (Judge Inst., Working 
Paper No. 21/97, 1997), http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mast0140/EJWP0599.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9F2-
827G].  
89. See Menno Treffers, The Royalty Rate for a Subset of Standard Essential Patents – What Is 
Reasonable?, IPWATCHDOG (May 22, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/22/royalty-rate-
standard-essential-patents/id=69045/ [https://perma.cc/XWH6-Z9JQ]; Bartlett & Contreras, supra 
note 27, at 309. But see Geradin & Layne-Farrar, supra note 83, at 779–80 (critiquing this 
methodology). 
90. Unwired Planet [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [182]. 
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Another fundamental question regarding the determination of FRAND 
royalties is whether the value of the patented technology should be 
assessed prior to (ex ante) or after (ex post) the approval of the relevant 
standard. Ex ante evaluation eliminates from consideration value that is 
created simply by virtue of being included in a standard. U.S. courts,91 
enforcement agencies,92 and commentators93 have largely concluded that 
a FRAND royalty should reflect the ex ante value of a patented technology 
without considering the added value attributable to the inclusion of the 
technology in a standard. In Unwired Planet, however, the U.K. court 
expressly rejected the U.S. approach with little explanation, noting instead 
that it was permissible to let a patentee appropriate some of the value 
associated with the inclusion of its technology in a standard.94 
Another point on which the U.K. court in Unwired Planet diverged 
from decisions in the United States was whether the FRAND royalty rate 
applicable to a particular patent is a single rate, or whether FRAND 
represents a range of possible royalty rates. In Microsoft v. Motorola, the 
U.S. district court determined a FRAND range for the SEPs covering each 
standard at issue in order to assess whether the SEP holder complied with 
its duty of good faith and fair dealing under applicable law; then, in setting 
a final royalty, the court picked a specific rate within the allowable 
range.95 In Unwired Planet, however, the U.K. court reasoned that it is 
                                                     
91. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1232; In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 
903, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
60233, at *61 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). 
92. FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH 
COMPETITION 22–23 (2011) (“A definition of RAND based on the ex ante value of the patented 
technology at the time the standard is chosen is necessary for consumers to benefit from competition 
among technologies to be incorporated into the standard.”). 
93. See Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 610 
(2007); Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 65, at 2036–39. Some commentators disagree. 
See, e.g., Sidak, supra note 56, at 1867 (“[T]he apportionment requirement cannot logically prohibit 
a SEP holder from receiving the value of the standard created by the technology in suit.”); Norman 
V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, The Value of the Standard, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1164 (“[A] 
FRAND royalty should reflect the incremental contribution of the patent to the value of the standard 
to the user.” (emphasis omitted)). 
94. Unwired Planet [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [97]. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of 
the Unwired Planet decision, see Jorge L. Contreras, Global Markets, Competition and FRAND 
Royalties: The Many Implications of Unwired Planet v. Huawei, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2017, at 
8 [hereinafter Contreras, Global Markets]. 
95. Microsoft, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *203. 
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better to maintain, as a matter of law, that there is but a single royalty rate 
that qualifies as FRAND for any given set of SEPs and products.96  
Finally, in addition to being “fair” and “reasonable,” FRAND royalty 
rates must be “non-discriminatory” or, in the phrasing adopted by ANSI, 
“demonstrably free of unfair discrimination.”97 That is, a SEP holder may 
not discriminate in what it charges to different licensees. Today, most 
courts and commentators agree that in order to comply with the non-
discrimination prong of a FRAND commitment, a SEP holder must treat 
“similarly situated” licensees in a similar manner. Commentators have 
understood this constraint to allow a SEP holder to charge differential 
royalty rates to product manufacturers based on their size or market share, 
even if they are otherwise similarly situated, on the basis that sellers of 
more products will pay more in royalties.98 There is disagreement, 
however, regarding the degree of similarity that must be evidenced by 
potential licensees in order to benefit from the same royalty rate or rate 
schedule. In TCL v. Ericsson, the court held that that similarly situated 
firms include “all firms reasonably well-established in the world market” 
for telecommunications products, thus entitling TCL, a producer of 
relatively inexpensive smartphones, to the same favorable royalty rates 
that the SEP holder had previously offered to producers of more expensive 
smartphones such as Apple and Samsung.99 Needless to say, different 
views regarding which firms are similarly situated can have a material 
impact on the rates charged by SEP holders.100 
C. The Challenge of Global Rates 
Courts adjudicating FRAND royalty rates face a dilemma. On one 
hand, patents are artifacts of national law and, by definition, have force 
                                                     
96. Unwired Planet [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [806(4)]. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect 
of the Unwired Planet decision, see Contreras, Global Markets, supra note 94, at 2–4 and J. Gregory 
Sidak, Is a FRAND Royalty a Point or a Range?, 2 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 401, 401 (2017). 
97. See ANSI Essential Requirements, supra note 12, § 3.1.1(b). For a detailed discussion of the 
non-discrimination prong of FRAND commitments, see Jorge L. Contreras & Anne Layne-Farrar, 
Non-Discrimination and FRAND Commitments, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 6, ch. 12. 
98. See Gilbert, supra note 14; Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An Economic 
Interpretation of FRAND, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 531, 548 (2013). 
99. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. CV 15-2370 
JVS(DFMX), 2018 WL 4488286, at *30 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2018). This decision is currently under 
appeal. 
100. See, e.g., Peter Georg Picht, FRAND Determination in TCL v. Ericsson and Unwired Planet 
v. Huawei: Same Same but Different? (Max Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition, Research 
Paper No. 18-07, 2018) (comparing how differently the courts in Unwired Planet and TCL v. Ericsson 
interpret the nondiscrimination requirement of FRAND). 
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only in the jurisdiction in which they are issued. On the other hand, the 
parties to FRAND disputes are often multinational corporations with 
operations (and patents) in dozens of jurisdictions across the globe.101 In 
determining a FRAND royalty rate, should a court focus only on the 
patents issued and asserted in its own jurisdiction, or should it consider 
the global business relationship between the parties? 
In the U.K. Unwired Planet case, Huawei, the potential licensee, 
argued that the court should determine a FRAND royalty only for 
Unwired Planet’s U.K. patents, as foreign patents could not be enforced 
in the United Kingdom and were not the subject of the parties’ 
litigation.102 But the court disagreed. First, it observed that “the vast 
majority” of SEP licenses in the industry, including all of the comparable 
licenses introduced at trial, were granted on a worldwide basis, with only 
occasional exclusions.103 It then noted that both Unwired Planet (which 
held SEPs in forty-two countries) and Huawei (which operated in fifty-
one countries) were global enterprises.104 Given these facts, the court 
reasoned that “a licensor and licensee acting reasonably and on a willing 
basis would agree on a worldwide licence.”105 In fact, the court considered 
the prospect of two large multinational companies agreeing to country-
by-country licensing “madness.”106 Accordingly, it held that, on these 
facts, a FRAND license can only be a worldwide license, and it proceeded 
to determine the FRAND royalty rates that Huawei should pay to Unwired 
Planet on a global basis.107 
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California reached a 
similar conclusion in TCL v. Ericsson, also determining worldwide 
FRAND royalty rates that TCL should pay to Ericsson.108 If courts in the 
United Kingdom and the United States can set global royalty rates, then 
why not courts in Germany, France, Canada, India, Korea, Japan, and 
                                                     
101. See, e.g., David L. Cohen, A Short History of Vringo’s Battle with ZTE, LINKEDIN (Oct. 11, 
2017), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/short-history-vringos-battle-zte-david-l-cohen/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q9H4-AX8L] (describing the multijurisdictional litigation between Vringo and 
ZTE); Kurt Eichenwald, The Great Smartphone War, VANITY FAIR (May 3, 2014), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/06/apple-samsung-smartphone-patent-war 
[https://perma.cc/278Z-JWBT] (describing litigation between Apple and Samsung across a dozen 
jurisdictions). 
102. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) [524]. 
103. Id. ¶ 534. Some comparable licenses, for example, excluded China. 
104. Id. ¶ 538. 
105. Id. ¶ 543. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. ¶¶ 583–89. 
108. See TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Nos. SACV 
14-341 JVS(DFMx), CV 15-2370 JVS(DFMx), 2018 WL 4488286, at *50–52 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 
2018).  
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China as well? In point of fact, a court in any jurisdiction that has the 
parties before it can establish a global royalty rate for them. And if the 
licensee refuses to agree to the global royalty rate determined by the court, 
the licensee risks being enjoined from selling products in the issuing 
jurisdiction. Thus, in Unwired Planet, Huawei could have refused to 
accept the U.K. court’s global license, but if it did so, it would have had 
to sacrifice its lucrative U.K. market, valued at approximately one billion 
pounds per year. This is a Hobson’s choice for any sizable product 
manufacturer: either accept a national court’s determination of global 
FRAND royalty rates or lose access to that court’s national market. 
In sum, a court in any country with a large enough internal market can 
set worldwide FRAND rates for parties with international operations. And 
once a worldwide license is granted, the licensee is authorized to 
manufacture and sell licensed products around the globe, thereby mooting 
proceedings in other jurisdictions, at least with respect to the issue of 
FRAND royalties.109 As a result, the first court to set a FRAND royalty 
rate will prevail over all other courts in the world. 
As the author has discussed in other work, this situation sets the stage 
for two unhealthy forms of litigation “race.”110 First is a “race to the 
bottom” among jurisdictions—a well-known phenomenon that has been 
observed in contexts ranging from corporate law111 to maritime vessel 
registration.112 The willingness of judges in particular jurisdictions to set 
high global FRAND rates could attract SEP holders to those jurisdictions, 
much as U.S. patent holders were once attracted to the patent-friendly 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.113 By the same token, 
                                                     
109. In addition, a court that is in the midst of hearing a case may issue an anti-suit injunction 
prohibiting the parties from prosecuting the case in other jurisdictions pending resolution by the first 
court. See Jorge L. Contreras, The New Extraterritoriality: FRAND Royalties, Anti-Suit Injunctions 
and the Global Race to the Bottom in Disputes over Standards-Essential Patents, 25 B.U. J. SCI. 
TECH. L. (forthcoming 2019) (describing anti-suit injunctions in recent FRAND disputes). 
110. See id. at §§ III.A, III.B; Contreras, Global Markets, supra note 94. 
111. Eisenberg & Miller, New York, supra note 25, at 1482–87 (describing New York’s sustained 
efforts to attract commercial contract litigation through both procedural and substantive rules); Daniel 
J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to the Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 381 (2005) (discussing the view that Delaware adjusted its corporate law to attract 
business incorporations). 
112. See Allan I. Mendelsohn, Flags of Convenience: Maritime and Aviation, 79 J. AIR L. & 
COMMERCE 151, 152–53 (2014) (“[I]t is fair to say that, as a direct consequence of what later became 
the highly popular and deregulated ‘flag-out’ movement, the world, and especially our own country, 
witnessed what can only be called a determined and successful race to the bottom.”). 
113. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Reining in a ‘Renegade’ Court: TC Heartland and the Eastern 
District of Texas, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1569, 1571 (2018) (“For many years, the judges in the Eastern 
District have encouraged patent plaintiffs to file their cases in the district.”); Brian J. Love & James 
Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 
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jurisdictions that establish reputations for setting low global FRAND rates 
may attract standards implementers seeking to challenge the rates offered 
by SEP holders. When jurisdictions intentionally adapt their rules and 
procedures, not to mention their substantive law, to attract litigants, legal 
rules may progressively be diluted in an effort to respond to the wishes of 
private parties.114 
A second unhealthy form of litigation race occurs when a litigant rushes 
to bring suit in a jurisdiction favorable to its position, often to foreclose 
suit in a less favorable jurisdiction. This situation is referred to as a “race 
to the courthouse”115 and may prematurely drive parties to litigation rather 
than negotiation or settlement. In 1981, Senator Bob Dole described a 
similar patchwork of federal patent law as a “forum shopper’s delight and 
an innovator’s nightmare” before the creation of the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit.116 
Given the disparities in treatment of the same issues by courts around 
the world, there is evidence that such forum shopping is already occurring 
in the area of patent litigation, and this trend is only likely to continue.117 
Huawei, in fact, raised the specter of such a race to the courthouse in its 
appeal of the U.K. Unwired Planet decision, arguing that “if any court can 
set a global rate then there will be a race between the SEP owner and the 
                                                     
20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017). The peculiar dominance of the Eastern District of Texas in U.S. 
patent litigation may be coming to an end following the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in TC 
Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, LLC, 581 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). See Anderson, 
supra, at 1571 (“The case struck a direct blow against what Justice Scalia famously referred to as the 
‘renegade jurisdiction [of East Texas].’” (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument, eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 846236, at *11)). 
114. See, e.g., Stefan Bechtold et al., Forum Selling Abroad, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. (2019, 
forthcoming) (observing phenomenon among German courts); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A 
Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1135, 1163–64 (2013) (“competition between jurisdictions . . . creates comity concerns” 
as well as other issues).  
115. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 119 n.12 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The federal 
declaratory judgment is not a prize to the winner of a race to the courthouses, but rather a declaration 
of rights that obviates the need to risk a state criminal proceeding or a race to the courthouses.”). 
116. 127 CONG. REC. S29,861 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1981) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
117. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Memorandum: Will the International Trade Commission or the 
Antitrust Division Set Policy on Monopoly and Innovation?, 3 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 701, 711 
(2018) (“As the quality of administrative adjudication deteriorates at the ITC, patent holders engaged 
in global disputes over licensing or infringement can choose to litigate their multijurisdictional 
disputes before highly sophisticated tribunals in other countries.”); Matthew Bultman, Patent Owners 
Taking Global View in Enforcement Efforts, LAW360 (July 18, 2018) (“The more the U.S. system is 
out of harmony with international standards, the more your international corporations will prefer to 
litigate elsewhere.” (quoting Randall Rader, a former chief judge of the Federal Circuit)). 
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implementer to choose what each perceives to be the most favourable 
jurisdiction.”118 
II. ANTECEDENTS AND BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A FRAND 
RATE-SETTING TRIBUNAL 
When a SEP holder and a product manufacturer disagree over the 
royalty rates that the SEP holder may validly charge, some form of dispute 
resolution is required. A typical form of dispute resolution is litigation. 
However, as discussed above, there are numerous areas in which courts 
disagree over the proper methodology for calculating FRAND royalties. 
Likewise, there are increasing indications that national courts will seek to 
make global FRAND rate determinations using their own favored 
methodologies. This, coupled with the lack of transparency of existing 
FRAND licenses and the failure of most FRAND calculations to address 
adequately the totality of patents covering a particular standard, suggests 
that any solution to the quandary of FRAND royalty rates must address 
the three issues of transparency, consistency, and comprehensiveness.119 
This Article proposes that this tripartite goal may be achieved through a 
global FRAND rate-setting tribunal rather than bilateral national 
litigation. This Part discusses existing precedents for such a rate-setting 
mechanism. These include existing alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
procedures for resolving FRAND disputes, mandatory arbitration 
procedures in contexts such as Internet domain name disputes, and expert 
rate-setting authorities in areas including copyright and public utilities. 
A. Arbitration of Patent and FRAND Disputes 
Binding arbitration is a common and legally respected mechanism for 
the resolution of commercial disputes.120 Like other commercial disputes, 
many disputes regarding the terms of FRAND licensing commitments are 
                                                     
118. Unwired Planet [2018] EWCA Civ 2344 at ¶ 101. The Court of Appeals found this argument 
unavailing, rejecting Huawei’s argument and reasoning: “It is true that a court in one country will 
decide, as between the parties, whether a global or multi-territorial license is FRAND but that is 
inevitable and we see nothing unfair about it . . . .” Id. ¶ 104. For a more detailed discussion of this 
point, see Contreras, Global Markets, supra note 94. 
119. See supra notes 20–32 and accompanying text. 
120. See generally Jacques de Werra, Global Policies for Arbitrating Intellectual Property 
Disputes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING, ch. 15 (Jacques de 
Werra ed., 2013); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY & 
MATERIALS (2d ed. 2001); Cremades & Plehn, supra note 27, at 324–25 (noting that parties are free 
to develop their own dispute resolution tribunals and procedures so long as they do not violate national 
policy). 
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already resolved through arbitration and other private ADR 
mechanisms.121 The European Commission recognized the following 
potential benefits of resolving FRAND disputes through ADR in 2014: 
(i)  faster resolution of conflicts; 
(ii) lower costs []; 
(iii) a lower threshold for parties to seek a solution when bilateral 
negotiations fail; 
(iv) more consistent outcomes, as parties can no longer do forum 
shopping; 
(v) higher quality outcomes, as a result of applicable competences, 
specialism and cumulative knowledge by the arbiters; 
(vi) fairer outcomes, especially when licensing conditions are not 
discussed under the threat of injunction; 
(vii) more creative and more focused on problem solving than 
litigation, which has always been based on an adversarial 
model; and 
(viii) once the dispute is over, the parties face no appeals, delays, 
continuing expenses, or unknown risks.122 
Another major benefit of arbitration over court adjudication is that, 
unlike judicial awards, most arbitral awards rendered in accordance with 
a customary set of due process procedures are recognized and enforceable 
in all countries that are parties to the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.123 
These benefits are widely recognized in different jurisdictions. The 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission has acknowledged arbitration to be a 
valid mechanism for resolving disputes over FRAND licensing.124 Most 
                                                     
121. Statistics on the number of FRAND disputes revolved through ADR are not available. 
Anecdotally, the author has served as an arbitrator in a large international FRAND dispute. See also 
Damien Geradin, FRAND Arbitration: The Determination of Fair, Reasonable and Non-
Discriminatory Rates for SEPs by Arbitral Tribunals, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (Sep. 2016) (providing 
recommendations and observations based on experience as an arbitrator). 
122. EUR. COMM’N, PATENTS AND STANDARDS: A MODERN FRAMEWORK FOR IPR-BASED 
STANDARDIZATION 178 (2014); EC SEP COMMC’N, supra note 34, at 11 (ADR “can offer swifter and 
less costly dispute resolution” than litigation.); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of 
Publicly-Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 336–39 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, 
Arbitration] (listing perceived benefits of commercial arbitration over judicial dispute resolution); 
Roger S. Haydock, Civil Justice and Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Mediation and 
Arbitration Now and for the Future, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 745, 748–49 (2000) (listing 
twelve factors supporting arbitration of disputes). 
123. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
124. See Motorola Mobility LLC, Case No. 1210120 (F.T.C. July 23, 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724googlemotorolado.pdf 
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recently, the Japan Patent Office, which has published a comprehensive 
Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents,125 
has actively promoted the use of ADR to resolve FRAND disputes.126 
Adding to these governmental sources, numerous academic 
commentators,127 government officials,128 and legal practitioners129 have 
encouraged the use of ADR in resolving FRAND disputes. These 
endorsements point to a growing recognition that ADR may offer 
satisfactory global solutions to FRAND disputes in a manner that can be 
more efficient than serial national-level litigation. 
Numerous mechanisms exist that enable parties to resolve FRAND-
related disputes through binding arbitration, and several institutions 
around the world have tailored rules and procedures for the adjudication 
of patent disputes. For example, the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA), which operates the International Center for Dispute Resolution 
(ICDR), has adopted Supplementary Rules for the Resolution of Patent 
Disputes.130 These rules address patent disputes within the framework of 
AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures.131 In 
addition, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which 
established the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center in 1994, has 
                                                     
[https://perma.cc/8K4A-NBES] [hereinafter Google Order] (decision and order) (binding arbitration 
is an acceptable method for resolving disputes over FRAND terms.). 
125. JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDE TO LICENSING NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING STANDARD 
ESSENTIAL PATENTS (2018), http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2018/06/20180605003/20180605003-
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/CNQ6-8MJL]. 
126. Press Release, Japan Patent Office, Mock International Arbitration - Toward Early Dispute 
Resolution of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) in the 5G Era - Held in Tokyo (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.jpo.go.jp/shoukai_e/soshiki_e/photo_gallery2018062991.html 
[https://perma.cc/ME6R-QH59] (describing mock international arbitration involving renowned 
international jurists). 
127. See Contreras & Newman, supra note 22; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114; Lemley, supra 
note 43, at 155.  
128. See Kühn et al., supra note 14, at 4; Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice Antitrust Division, Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch 9 (Oct. 10, 2012), 
(transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/287855.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5MS6-4GNS]). 
129. See FOER & VAHEESAN, supra note 37, at 17; David A. Balto & Daniel I. Prywes, Standard-
Setting Disputes: The Need for FTC Guidelines, FTC WATCH (Mar. 25, 2002), 
https://www.mlexwatch.com/ftcwatch/articles/177/ftc-watch-no-585 [http://perma.cc/JSB7-KD44]. 
130. RESOLUTION OF PATENT DISPUTES SUPPLEMENTARY RULES (AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N 2006), 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Resolution%20of%20Patent%20Disputes%20Supplementary%2
0Rules.pdf (last visited May 18, 2019). 
131. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES (AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N 
2013), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf (last visited May 18, 2019).  
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recently developed a set of model agreements for the submission of 
FRAND disputes for WIPO mediation or arbitration.132 
Despite these advances, bilateral arbitration is not a panacea for 
multinational FRAND disputes. As a general rule, arbitration proceedings 
are conducted privately. Thus all parties, including the arbitrators, are 
obliged, either by law, ethical obligation, or contract, to maintain the 
confidentiality of the evidence presented, the parties’ arguments, and the 
arbitral award.133 Thus, the requirement of transparency is not met. 
Moreover, arbitration proceedings are generally brought to resolve 
disputes between two parties only and have little to no bearing on disputes 
with other parties. They thus lack the element of comprehensiveness. 
Finally, there is no mechanism within the international arbitration 
framework for precedential or res judicata effect of one decision on 
another, thus eliminating any requirement of consistency from one 
decision to the next. Thus, while arbitration of FRAND disputes may have 
some advantages over litigation, arbitration does not satisfactorily address 
the most significant problems inherent in FRAND disputes today. 
B. Mandatory Arbitration 
Arbitration generally takes place when parties mutually agree to forego 
judicial resolution of a dispute in favor of private resolution of their 
differences.134 Non-judicial resolution of disputes cannot be compelled; 
the parties must, at some point, agree to it. Of course, not all arbitration 
agreements are negotiated between sophisticated parties. Standardized 
consumer contracts for telephone service, credit cards, and computer 
software, as well as employment agreements, often contain arbitration 
clauses that are routinely enforced by the courts even if poorly understood 
by consumers.135 Similarly, the Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
                                                     
132. See WIPO ADR for FRAND Disputes, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/specific-sectors/ict/frand/ [https://perma.cc/MR8G-DRME]. 
133. See generally TREVOR COOK & ALEJANDRO I. GARCIA, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ARBITRATION, ch. 9 (2010); de Werra, supra note 120, at 361–63 (“Confidentiality is 
generally viewed as one of the classic reasons why parties choose arbitration.”). 
134. See, e.g., BORN, supra note 120, at 53 (“The foundation for almost every international 
arbitration is an international arbitration agreement. Absent a valid agreement to arbitrate, there is 
generally no basis for requiring arbitration or for enforcing an arbitral award against a party.”). 
135. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (upholding employment 
arbitration clauses prohibiting class action claims); Paul Bennett Marrow & Craig E. Penn, The 
‘Circle of Assent’ Doctrine and the Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clause: When the 
Unconscionable Contract Analysis Just Won’t Do, 68 DISPUTE RESOL. J., No. 3, 2013 (discussing 
enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion); Katherine V.W. Stone, 
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Resolution Policy (UDRP) for resolving Internet domain name disputes is 
mandated by agreements between the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) and Internet domain name registrars, 
which, in turn, pass this requirement down to individual domain name 
registrants.136 Thus, the term “mandatory” arbitration is something of a 
misnomer, as an agreement technically underlies all such arbitration 
proceedings. 
Likewise, parties that participate in an SDO, either through formal 
membership or involvement in its standards-development activities, are 
generally deemed to have agreed to abide by the SDO’s rules and 
policies.137 Thus, if an SDO, as part of its formal rules, requires that its 
participants submit disputes regarding FRAND royalties to binding 
arbitration in lieu of court adjudication, then the participants in that SDO 
who are bound by those rules must do so. 
This “mandatory” arbitration approach is not uncommon in patent 
pools, several of which require their members to submit disputes to 
arbitration.138 Likewise, a handful of SDOs require that certain disputes 
among their members be resolved through binding arbitration. These 
include the Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) Project, which requires its 
members to resolve disputes regarding licenses of DVB standards under 
the arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC);139 
the VMEbus International Trade Association (VITA), which requires 
patent-related disputes to be resolved through arbitration administered by 
VITA itself;140 and the Blu-Ray Disc Association, which requires that 
                                                     
Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective Litigation and Arbitration Under the Labor Law, 
61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 164 (2013) (discussing employment agreement arbitration clauses). 
136. See WIPO Guide to Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/guide (last visited Apr. 22, 2019); LAURA 
DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 192–94 (2014). There are four 
authorized providers of UDRP arbitration services: WIPO itself, the Forum (formerly the National 
Arbitration Forum), the Czech Arbitration Court (CAC), and the Asian Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Centre (ADNDRC). See Doug Isenberg, What It Costs to File a UDRP Complaint, 
GIGALAW BLOG (Feb. 13, 2019), https://giga.law/blog/2019/2/27/what-it-costs-to-file-a-udrp-
complaint (last visited May 18, 2019); DENARDIS, supra, at 193. 
137. See Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent 
Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV 479, 503–04 (2015) (describing the means by which SDO policies are 
made binding on participants, either through contract or corporate policy). 
138. See Merges, supra note 32, at 1344–46 (describing arbitration requirements for aviation and 
automobile patent pools). 
139. Memorandum of Understanding from the Digital Video Broadcasting Project, § 14.7 (Jan. 3, 
2014), http://www.dvb.org/resources/public/documents_site/dvb_mou.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9QJ-
EK6Z].  
140. VITA, VSO POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 10.5 (revision 2.8 Sept. 1, 2015), 
https://www.vita.com/resources/Documents/Policies/vso-pp-r2d8.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6NN-
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patent licensing disputes be resolved through arbitration by the AAA.141 
In contrast, other SDO policies merely state that members “may” arbitrate 
SEP-related disputes, in which case arbitration is voluntary.142 In practice, 
it appears that neither the DVB nor the VITA arbitration policies have 
formally been invoked. Thus, the only documented invocation of a 
mandatory SDO arbitration policy has been at the Blu-Ray Disc 
Association.143 
In 2013, Professors Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro recommended that 
SDOs mandate that portfolio royalty rates for SEPs subject to FRAND 
licensing be determined through binding arbitration.144 The form of 
arbitration they proposed for this purpose was so-called “baseball” or 
“final offer” arbitration.145 Under this procedure, each party submits a 
sealed bid to an arbitrator, and the arbitrator is limited to choosing one of 
the competing bids without modification.146 Lemley and Shapiro also 
                                                     
ZM9E] (“Any VSO member who believes a WG Member or the VITA Member Company that the 
WG Member represents has not complied with his/her or its obligations under this Patent Policy, 
including but not limited to obligations under Section 10.3 to grant licenses on terms that are fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory, may submit his/her claim in this respect to the applicable WG 
Chairperson. If the claim is not thereupon resolved on an informal basis within fifteen (15) days of its 
submission, the WG Chairperson will commence an Arbitration Procedure in accordance with the 
provisions set forth below.”). The VITA patent policy is best known for its requirement that patent 
holders disclose the maximum royalty rates they will charge for patents essential to VITA standards 
on an ex ante basis, a provision that was the subject of considerable controversy. See Contreras, Ex 
Ante, supra note 36, at 173–74.  
141. BLU-RAY DISC ASS’N, AMENDED & RESTATED BYLAWS OF BLU-RAY DISC ASSOCIATION 
cl. 16(5), (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.blu-raydisc.com/Assets/Downloadablefile/BDA_ 
Bylaws_%28v2.0%29-18618.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZHP-SUFW]. 
142. An interesting hybrid “balanced safe harbour” approach was proposed at ETSI around 2014, 
in which SEP holders would have been prohibited from seeking an injunction to prevent an infringer 
from operating under a SEP until the SEP holder had submitted to binding arbitration or judicial 
determination of the appropriate FRAND rate. The proposal, which was backed by several major SEP 
holders, was not adopted. See Harri Kalimo et al., EU Intellectual Property Rights Law – Driving 
Innovation or Stifling the Digital Single Market?, in EU ECONOMIC LAW IN A TIME OF CRISIS 151, 
155 (Harri Kalimo & Max S. Jansson eds., 2016). 
143. The Blu-Ray arbitration policy became the subject of litigation in Zoran Corp. v. DTS, Inc., 
No. C 08-4655 JF (HRL), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6675 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009), a dispute concerning 
the SEP licensing terms offered by DTS to its fellow SDO member Zoran. Zoran brought an 
arbitration claim against DTS, claiming that DTS violated its FRAND commitment and 
simultaneously filed an antitrust and patent misuse suit against DTS in federal district court. Id. at 
*2–3. Among other things, the court validated the Blu-Ray arbitration policy and stayed Zoran’s 
antitrust and misuse claims pending resolution of the arbitration. Id. at *19–20. 
144. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1138.  
145. See id. at 1141, 1144–46.  
146. There are several variants of baseball arbitration, including forms in which issues are decided 
serially, offers are revealed to or concealed from the counterparty, parties are permitted to submit two 
final offers, and more. See Elissa M. Meth, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution 
in Domestic and International Disputes, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 383, 393–98 (1999). 
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proposed that the decision of the arbitrator be disclosed to other willing 
licensees of the relevant SEPs,147 at least partially addressing the concerns 
over transparency raised above. 
While some commentators supported the prospect of SDO-mandated 
arbitration of FRAND disputes,148 the Lemley-Shapiro proposal 
precipitated a cascade of opposition from others on grounds ranging from 
due process concerns about requiring parties to waive their right to seek 
redress from the courts, concerns that the binary nature of baseball 
arbitration could not guaranty that a FRAND royalty would actually be 
chosen, concerns regarding bias and accuracy of the decision, and 
potential gamesmanship with respect to the parties’ selected rates.149 
Despite some similarities in the FRAND rate-setting tribunal proposed in 
this Article and the Lemley-Shapiro proposal, the use of baseball 
arbitration is not suggested. While baseball arbitration may provide an 
expedient mechanism for disposing of disputes between two parties, it is 
not a suitable mechanism for determining an aggregate FRAND rate 
across multiple parties and patents (the need for comprehensiveness), nor 
does it satisfy the need for a solution that is transparent (given that the 
baseball-style arbitrator is not required to reveal his or her reasoning in 
reaching a decision) or consistent (given that baseball-style arbitrators 
cannot apply consistent methodologies when reaching decisions if they 
are bound only to select one of the two options presented to them by the 
parties). 
                                                     
147. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1145. 
148. See, e.g., FOER & VAHEESAN, supra note 37, at 17 (“SSOs should establish and require 
participation in dispute resolution processes that offer a quicker, more cost-effective alternative to 
litigation.”); Balto & Prywes, supra note 129 (“Standard-setting groups should be encouraged to 
require alternative dispute resolution procedures for resolving disputes about licensing terms.”). 
149. See RÉGIBEAU ET AL., supra note 36, at 79 (“While the majority of respondents seem to be 
favourable to the introduction of arbitration mechanisms, few appear ready to support making them 
mandatory.”); Geradin, supra note 121, at 5 (objecting to loss of party freedom to self-determine 
arbitral rules and tribunal, as well as unsuitability of baseball arbitration to determining FRAND 
royalty rates); Pierre Larouche et al., Settling FRAND Disputes: Is Mandatory Arbitration a 
Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory Alternative?, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581, 584 (2014) 
(“[T]he mandatory-arbitration proposal is . . . an unnecessary intervention given the absence of 
market failure and, more importantly, given that it poses a significant risk of negatively impacting 
the successful adoption of technical, consensus-based industry standards.”); J. Gregory Sidak, 
Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of FRAND Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 18 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 1, 38 (2014) (“The package that Lemley and Shapiro call ‘best practices’ is in fact 
not a narrow proposal for binding baseball arbitration but rather a roadmap to redefine patent 
rights in a manner that would transfer wealth from inventors to infringers.”); Contreras & 
Newman, supra note 22, at 43–44 (arguing arbitrators’ lack of enunciated reasoning in a baseball 
arbitration decision does little to guide future behavior, nor can the result be assumed to be FRAND). 
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C. Rate-Setting 
As discussed above, if parties cannot mutually agree on FRAND 
royalty rates, they currently have recourse to the courts as well as private 
arbitration. In either case, the parties are bound by the rate determination 
made by an independent adjudicatory authority (subject to permitted 
appeals) after applicable evidence is presented and arguments are made. 
Thus, the notion that FRAND royalties can be established by an external 
(non-party, non-SDO) body is not a new one. However, as discussed in 
the Introduction, courts around the world, and even within the same 
jurisdiction, may differ with regard to both the methodologies they use 
and the evidence that they consider in determining FRAND rates.150 This 
inconsistency, which appears to be increasing, is one of the principal 
pitfalls of the current FRAND system. Thus, any effective solution should 
offer a consistent methodology for making FRAND rate determinations. 
One well-known method for establishing rates in a consistent manner 
is allocating rate-setting authority to an expert body. Rate-setting bodies 
have been established in a multitude of contexts throughout history. 
Richard Epstein traces the origin of rate-setting authority to Sir Thomas 
Hale’s influential 1670 treatise De Portibus Maris, which discusses the 
need to regulate the prices charged by owners of wharves and other public 
accommodations “affected with a publick interest.”151 Epstein goes on to 
recount the history of rate setting in England and the United States in 
industries including grain elevators, railroads, and public utilities.152 
Interestingly, many of the rate-setting tribunals established in these early 
proceedings sought to ensure that rates charged by regulated providers 
would be “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (RAND),153 echoing and 
foreshadowing the FRAND commitments of today.154 
One of the touchstones of a rate-setting tribunal is that it should operate 
under a consistent set of principles and procedures, taking into account all 
                                                     
150. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying discussion. 
151. Richard A. Epstein, The History of Public Utility Rate Regulation in the United States 
Supreme Court: Of Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory Rates, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 345, 346 (2013) 
(quoting Matthew Hale, “De Portibus Maris”, in A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW 
OF ENGLAND 77–78 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1787)). 
152. Id. at 350–65. 
153. Id. at 348–50, 352–57 (discussing, inter alia, the Minnesota Rate Cases, 134 U.S. 418 (1890) 
(“equal and reasonable” rates), and Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 527 (1898) (“reasonable” rates)). 
154. See Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard 
Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 47–48 (2015) (tracing origin 
of SDO FRAND commitments to 1912 Terminal Railroad case that required access to St. Louis 
railroad terminal on “just and reasonable” terms). 
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relevant evidence pertinent to the case at hand.155 Its decisions should also 
be written and made public so as to offer as much guidance as possible to 
the industry in shaping future conduct. The rate-setting body should also 
continue in existence beyond the resolution of particular disputes, thus 
enabling its members to develop relevant expertise and custom that can 
be applied consistently from case to case.156 The expertise and industry 
knowledge resident within such a body can reduce the cost of each case 
decided, as the parties need not educate novice judges or juries regarding 
the practices and norms of the industry with each new case.157 Moreover, 
a rate setting tribunal can apply independent judgment and discretion 
when determining rates that must meet a loosely-defined standard, such 
as the “just and reasonable” rates that are established by public utility 
tribunals.158 
The benefits of consistency and continuity in a rate-setting body were 
acknowledged by Congress in connection with royalties under the 
compulsory license provisions of the U.S. Copyright Act.159 In 1993, 
Congress enacted the Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act, which 
provided that such royalty determinations would be made by a series of 
ad hoc three-member Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels (CARPs) 
appointed by the Librarian of Congress.160 The CARPs and their rotating 
group of ad hoc arbitrators were heavily criticized, among other things, 
for unpredictability, inconsistency, lack of expertise, and potential bias.161 
As a result, in 2004 Congress replaced the ad hoc CARPs with a 
permanent Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) consisting of three full-time 
Copyright Royalty Judges.162 
                                                     
155. See Epstein, supra note 151, at 366. 
156. See, e.g., 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.27[C] (2018) (discussing criticism of former ad hoc 
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels). 
157. See Merges, supra note 32, at 1317 (noting inefficiencies of serial court litigation over 
copyright license rates and suggesting a “rate court” as a means for avoiding excessive transaction 
costs). 
158 See William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic Regulation in 
America, 35 YALE J. REG. 721 (2018) (tracing history of “just price” determinations from Aristotle 
through modern public utility regulation).  
159. The Copyright Act of 1976 established four categories of compulsory copyright license: 
musical mechanical, noncommercial broadcasting, jukebox, and cable television. See 2 NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, supra note 156, § 7.27[A]. 
160. Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-198, 107 Stat. 2304 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and at 8 U.S.C. § 1288 (2018)). The 1993 Act replaced 
a prior rate-setting authority established under the 1976 Copyright Act. See 2 NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, supra note 156, § 7.27[C]. 
161. See 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 156, § 7.27[C]. 
162. H.R. REP. NO. 108-408, at 20 (2004).  
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While there are clearly distinctions between the compulsory licensing 
of copyrights and the FRAND licensing of SEPs, many aspects of the 
CRB could be adopted in a new FRAND rate-setting tribunal. These 
similarities begin with the fundamental purpose of each body: to establish 
rates for IP licensing when private parties are committed to grant all users 
of the relevant IP a license at rates that are initially unspecified and when 
the parties are unable to reach agreement amongst themselves.163 As such, 
several attributes of the CRB can usefully inform the design of a FRAND 
rate-setting tribunal. For instance, Copyright Royalty Judges are required 
by statute to possess certain expertise: one (the Chief Judge) must have 
experience in adjudications, arbitrations, or trials, and the other two 
Judges must have significant knowledge in the field of copyright law and 
economics, respectively.164 Likewise, in making their determinations, the 
CRB evaluates substantial evidence and testimony from a range of fact 
and expert witnesses.165 Illustrating the scale and scope of these hearings, 
the Board’s 2015 proceedings regarding rates for noninteractive 
webcasting lasted four months and generated more than 12,000 pages of 
exhibits, with oral testimony from forty-seven witnesses (including 
fourteen economists).166 These observations suggest that it is possible to 
establish an expert rate-setting board with the capability, capacity, and 
expertise to establish royalty levels with respect to complex intellectual 
property matters. 
Likewise, the CRB is charged with allocating a large royalty pool to 
the owners of copyrights in television broadcasts after they have been 
retransmitted by cable providers.167 In some cases, hundreds or thousands 
                                                     
163. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Assn. of Am. v. Librarian of Congress, 608 F.3d 861, 863 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (“By law, the Copyright Royalty Board sets the terms and rates for copyright royalties 
when copyright owners and licensees fail to negotiate terms and rates themselves.”). 
164. 17 U.S.C. § 802(a)(1). 
165. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Assn. of Am., 608 F.3d at 864 (describing CRB proceedings 
“involving 28 days of live testimony, more than 140 exhibits, and more than 340 pleadings, motions, 
and orders”). 
166. David R. Strickler, Royalty Rate Setting for Sound Recordings by the United States Copyright 
Royalty Board: The Judicial Need for Independent Scholarly Economic Analysis, 12 REV. ECON. RES. 
ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 1, 2 (2015); see also Recording Indus. Assn. of Am., 608 F.3d at 864 (CRB 
hearings regarding compulsory license rates in 2006 involved “28 days of live testimony, more than 
140 exhibits, and more than 340 pleadings, motions, and orders”). 
167. 17 U.S.C. § 802(a)(1); see also Indep. Producers Grp. v. Librarian of Cong., 792 F.3d 132, 
135 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Under 17 U.S.C. § 111(c), after a broadcast television station transmits 
copyrighted material to its viewers, cable systems may retransmit that material without first obtaining 
the copyright owner’s permission. In exchange for that privilege, cable systems must deposit 
statutorily prescribed royalty fees with the Register of Copyrights. The Copyright Royalty Board is 
responsible for determining how to distribute those fees to the appropriate copyright owners.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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of copyright holders can be implicated in these proceedings. The 
procedure by which the CRB determines this allocation is informative. 
First, all copyright holders who wish to claim a share of the previous 
year’s aggregate pool of cable retransmission royalties must file a claim 
with the CRB.168 If all claimants agree how the pool should be allocated, 
then the CRB simply authorizes the distribution of funds to the claimants 
in the amounts agreed.169 However, if the claimants cannot agree, then the 
CRB conducts a two-phase proceeding to determine the allocation of 
royalties.170 These proceedings are explained by the D.C. Circuit as 
follows: 
During Phase I, claimants may group themselves into categories 
based on the kind of programming that they own. Using evidence 
supplied by the claimants, the Board calculates the marketplace 
value of each category. It then assigns a percentage of the total 
royalty fee fund to each category based on its value relative to 
other categories. During Phase II, the Board subdivides the fees 
allotted to each category among the individual claimants within 
that category. 
Phase I and Phase II proceedings follow the same set of 
procedures. First, the Board publishes a notice of the proceeding 
in the Federal Register. Claimants then petition to participate in 
the proceeding. A three-month voluntary negotiation period 
ensues, during which the participating claimants attempt to reach 
an agreement without assistance from the Board. 
At the end of the voluntary negotiation period, if any disputes 
remain, the Board plays a more active role in the process. The 
Board accepts written statements from the participating 
claimants, allows the participating claimants to conduct 
discovery, and orders a post-discovery settlement conference. If 
the participating claimants are still unable to resolve their 
differences, the Board then conducts a hearing and issues a final 
determination. Finally, the Librarian of Congress publishes the 
Board’s determination in the Federal Register and distributes the 
royalty fees.171 
As the above description demonstrates, royalty determination and 
distribution proceedings conducted by the CRB are not dissimilar to the 
types of determinations that would be required of a FRAND rate-setting 
                                                     
168. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(4)(A). 
169. Id. § 111(d)(4)(B)–(d)(4)(C), 801(b)(7). 
170. Id. § 111(d)(4)(B). 
171. Indep. Producers Grp., 792 F.3d at 135–36 (citations omitted). 
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tribunal: multiple parties with divergent interests are involved; the parties 
are initially permitted to work out an arrangement amongst themselves, 
but if they cannot, the tribunal’s procedures are activated; and the tribunal 
is empowered to compel discovery, conduct hearings, and otherwise 
adduce all relevant evidence.172 
The similarity between FRAND rate determinations and copyright 
royalty tribunal determinations has also been observed in the U.K. Sir 
Justice Colin Birss of the U.K. High Court (Patents) made a such an 
observation about the rate-setting capability of the U.K. Copyright 
Tribunal, of which he was once a member,173 and its similarity to FRAND 
rate determinations: “Similar kinds of analysis are done in the United 
Kingdom Copyright Tribunal setting an appropriate royalty rate in a 
licensing scheme. The parties there are not challenging the underlying 
rights. The only issue is the tariff terms. There is nothing intrinsically 
unjusticiable about the issue to be resolved.”174 A similar observation was 
made by Sir Justice Henry Carr in a recent case management decision, in 
which he noted that the mechanics of FRAND rate determinations “are 
entirely familiar” to “those familiar with . . . the Copyright Tribunal” and 
“are not that complicated, and the courts are used to dealing with them.”175 
It is important to note that the copyright rate-setting bodies discussed 
above are governmentally-chartered entities whose determinations are 
subject to review by the courts under both the tribunal’s authorizing 
legislation and the Administrative Procedure Act.176 This Article does not 
propose the creation of a new governmental rate-setting body. In fact, it 
is precisely the potential for national governmental bodies (e.g., courts, 
agencies) to diverge and compete in their rate-setting methodologies (i.e., 
the race to the bottom) that calls for the establishment of a single, 
international, non-governmental rate-setting tribunal for FRAND 
royalties, as discussed in greater detail in the next Part. 
                                                     
172. This being said, not all observers are satisfied with the CRB’s copyright royalty 
determinations. For example, Professor Mark Schultz has criticized the CRB for consistently favoring 
licensees in its sound recording royalty determinations, a bias that he also finds in the determination 
of SEP royalties. Mark Schultz, The Market for Performance Rights in Sound Recordings: Bargaining 
in the Shadow of Compulsory Licensing (Nov. 28, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3292512 (last visited Apr. 28, 2019). 
173. Beverly Barton, An Interview with Mr Justice Birss: Part 1/3: Getting Personal, THOMPSON 
REUTERS: DISPUTE RESOL. BLOG (Apr. 7, 2016), http://disputeresolutionblog.practicallaw.com/an-
interview-with-mr-justice-birss-part-13-getting-personal/ [https://perma.cc/9BCY-5BQW]. 
174. Vringo Infrastructure, Inc. v. ZTE (UK) Ltd. [2013] EWHC (Pat) 1591 [35] (Birss J). 
175. TQ Delta, LLC v. Zyxel Commc’ns UK Ltd. [2019] EWHC (Pat) 353 [22] (Carr J). Mr. Justice 
Carr goes on to discuss several similarities between FRAND rate determinations and the 
determinations of the U.K. Copyright Tribunal. Id. at [24]–[25]. 
176. See Indep. Producers Grp., 792 F.3d at 136. 
07 - Contreras (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/18/2019 7:58 PM 
738 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:701 
 
III. FRAMEWORK FOR A GLOBAL FRAND RATE-SETTING 
TRIBUNAL 
As discussed in the preceding Parts, a mechanism is needed for the 
resolution of disputes concerning FRAND royalty rates that addresses the 
tripartite issues of transparency, consistency, and comprehensiveness. 
This Part outlines a proposal for global, non-governmental FRAND rate-
setting tribunal that takes into account each of these issues. 
The major features of the proposed FRAND Tribunal are the following: 
SDOs can require (mandatory version) or offer (optional version) that 
their participants resolve all disputes regarding the level of FRAND 
royalties to be charged for SEPs covering the SDO’s standards through an 
international, non-governmental rate-setting tribunal. Once the tribunal is 
engaged, it will collect all available evidence regarding the patented and 
unpatented technology included in a particular standard, determine an 
aggregate royalty rate for the standard, and apportion royalties among all 
SEP holders. Other than these rate-setting matters, the tribunal would 
adjudicate no other issues, and related breach of contract, antitrust, and 
competition law claims would continue to be subject to adjudication by 
any court(s) having jurisdiction. SDO participants would be required to 
refrain from seeking injunctive relief against potential licensees during the 
pendency of rate-setting proceedings, but once FRAND royalty rates are 
determined for a specific standard, a SEP holder will be permitted to 
pursue injunctions against product manufacturers that refuse to accept a 
license at the designated rate within a reasonable time. The remainder of 
this Part discusses details of this proposal, including alternative structures 
that could be created. 
A. Mandatory and Optional Versions 
There are two versions of the FRAND Tribunal proposed by this 
Article: a mandatory version and an optional version.177 The difference 
between these two versions relates solely to whether use of the FRAND 
Tribunal is mandatory or optional for participants in an SDO. In the 
mandatory version, use of the FRAND Tribunal would be required to 
                                                     
177. An even stronger variant exists (“pre-emptive”), in which the SDO refers all standards covered 
by FRAND-encumbered SEPs to the rate tribunal, even before a dispute arises. A pre-emptive 
mechanism would result in rate-setting for all of the SDO’s FRAND-encumbered standards. While 
there are benefits to such a pre-emptive approach (e.g., rates would be set early, before disputes arise 
in the market), it could also be more burdensome on SDO participants and could increase transactional 
costs in settings in which no dispute over FRAND rates may ever have arisen. As such, this Article 
does not recommend the pre-emptive approach. 
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determine FRAND royalty rates when the parties cannot mutually agree 
on them. Though such a requirement could be imposed through various 
mechanisms, including statutory, regulatory, and treaty obligations, the 
most effective mechanism for imposing such a requirement is through 
binding provisions of SDO policies.178 In the optional version, the 
FRAND Tribunal is available for parties to use if they so wish, much as 
arbitration and other ADR mechanisms are currently available for the 
voluntary adjudication of FRAND disputes.179 
The choice of private over governmental adjudication has longstanding 
precedent in the area of intellectual property pooling, where private 
mechanisms have historically been substituted for legal structures.180 This 
Article likewise favors the use of a FRAND Tribunal under SDO policy 
requirements rather than governmental mandates (legislative or 
administrative rules) for several reasons. First, one of the problems 
affecting FRAND rate determinations today is that of inconsistency across 
jurisdictions. As mentioned previously, at least a dozen jurisdictions are 
involved in contemporary disputes over standardized products.181 The 
prospect of a dozen jurisdictions enacting identical mandates ceding the 
power of local courts to an international non-governmental body appears 
slim and would most likely result in a patchwork of divergent and 
contradictory rules that would do little to alleviate the issues caused by 
inconsistency across jurisdictions. Of course, such consistency could be 
achieved, at least to some degree, if the commitment to utilize the tribunal 
were the subject of a treaty obligation. However, the difficulty of 
multilateral treaty negotiation is significant, particularly in the current 
geopolitical environment, and it is extremely unlikely that such a treaty 
could be negotiated and ratified within a reasonable period of time, if ever. 
An SDO-based requirement, while not universal in scope (i.e., it 
pertains only to participants in SDOs that impose the requirement), at least 
offers consistency across licenses pertaining to the imposing SDO’s 
standards, irrespective of the jurisdictions in which its participants 
operate. That is, if a particular SDO mandates—through its bylaws, 
corporate policies, membership agreements, or other documentation—
that its participants utilize the proposed FRAND Tribunal to resolve 
FRAND rate disputes, then an SDO participant will be obliged to utilize 
                                                     
178. See supra Section II.B and accompanying text (discussing imposition of binding requirements 
on SDO participants). 
179. See supra Section II.A (discussing voluntary arbitration of FRAND disputes). 
180. See Merges, supra note 32, at 1347 (quoting Recording of Patent Pooling Agreements and 
Contracts with the Commissioner of Patents: Hearing on H.R. 4523 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 
74th Cong. 501, 529–30 (1935) (statement of Sidney R. Kent, President, Fox Film Corp.)). 
181. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  
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the tribunal whether it is based in the United States, Europe, or Japan and 
whether an unlicensed manufacturer of standardized products is based in 
China, Korea, or Brazil. 
The mandatory version of this proposal, though in some respects novel, 
is by no means unprecedented. As discussed in Section II.A above, a few 
SDOs already require arbitration of disputes by their participants, and in 
the one case in which this arbitration requirement was challenged, it was 
upheld.182 Likewise, arbitration of disputes is mandated in a variety of 
other contexts, including WIPO’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Procedure 
for Internet domain name controversies.183 
One important question relating to mandatory use of the proposed 
FRAND Tribunal is the degree to which an SDO may require non-
participants (i.e., manufacturers of standardized products that were not 
involved in developing the standard) to participate in such proceedings. 
As discussed above, an SDO may impose binding requirements upon its 
participants through a variety of contractual and corporate means, but it 
has less authority to bind organizations that have not voluntarily acceded 
to its rules and policies.184 Yet in order for the proposed FRAND Tribunal 
to achieve the goal of comprehensiveness, it should take into account 
patents held by SDO non-participants. There are several ways that this 
issue could be addressed. First, the SDO could affirmatively require, as a 
condition to the use of its standards (through a clickwrap or similar 
agreement), that such user agree to resolve any disputes regarding 
FRAND royalties through the FRAND Tribunal. Second, if an SDO did 
not wish to impose such a condition on the use of its standards, it could 
simply impose the requirement on its participants and hope, not 
unreasonably, that non-participants would view this dispute resolution 
mechanism as superior to litigation and thus participate. In many cases, 
however, major product manufacturers participate in SDOs and even hold 
SEPs themselves.185 Thus, the number of firms that would not be formally 
bound by the proposed adjudication requirements is likely to be small. 
It is important to note that while the mandatory version of this proposal 
is recommended, the optional version could also have a significant 
positive impact on the FRAND royalty landscape. Under both versions of 
                                                     
182. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing Zoran Corp. v. DTS, Inc., No. C 08-
4655 JF (HRL), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6675 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009)). 
183. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
184. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, When a Stranger Calls: Standards Outsiders and Unencumbered 
Patents, 12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 507 (2016) (discussing the implications of SDO “outsiders” 
holding SEPs); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1153 (discussing issues relating to arbitration 
with unwilling implementers). 
185. See Baron & Pohlmann, supra note 7, at 534, fig.A1. 
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this proposal, a rate-setting proceeding is triggered by the emergence of a 
dispute between a SEP holder and a product manufacturer over the 
appropriate level of FRAND royalties. Once the tribunal proceeding is 
triggered, whether by operation of the SDO’s policy (mandatory) or by 
mutual agreement of the parties (optional), the tribunal will proceed to 
gather all relevant evidence concerning the value of patented and 
unpatented technology contributing to the standard. The tribunal will then 
develop both an aggregate royalty rate applicable to all SEPs covering the 
standard as well as an individual allocation of that aggregate royalty to 
each SEP holder (i.e., an allocation schedule listing each SEP holder and 
the portion of the aggregate FRAND royalty to which it is entitled). Thus, 
the FRAND Tribunal’s findings will not be limited to the parties that 
initiated the proceeding—they will be comprehensive. 
In the mandatory version of the proposal, every other SEP holder with 
patents covering the relevant standard is bound to offer FRAND royalty 
rates consistent with the allocation schedule developed by the tribunal. 
Additional proceedings are not required, thus reducing the overall 
transactional burden on the market. 
In the optional version of the proposal, other SEP holders are not 
strictly bound by the findings of the FRAND Tribunal in the initial 
proceeding. However, the FRAND Tribunal’s proceedings, and the 
resulting schedule of FRAND allocations to each SEP holder, will be 
made public186 and will thus be available to any court or arbitral tribunal 
that later parties choose to adjudicate their dispute. As such, it is likely 
that the FRAND Tribunal’s findings will serve, at a minimum, as 
informative to a subsequent court or arbitrator and, preferably, as a 
presumptive finding regarding the appropriate FRAND rate for the 
standard in dispute. Thus, even under the optional version of this proposal, 
litigation time and cost may be reduced on an industry-wide basis. 
It is anticipated that some SDOs may be reluctant, at first, to adopt the 
mandatory version of this proposal and may, instead, choose the optional 
version.187 Use of the optional version could serve as a “trial run” of the 
FRAND Tribunal for early-adopter SDOs, allowing them to observe the 
effectiveness of the FRAND Tribunal and its decision-making processes. 
If an SDO is satisfied with the FRAND Tribunal during such a trial period, 
it may later choose to adopt the mandatory version of this proposal. 
                                                     
186. See infra Section III.G. 
187. A similar pattern of adoption was observed in 2006–2007, when several SDOs considered the 
adoption of ex ante licensing disclosure policies. Of three SDOs that explicitly considered such 
policies, only one (VITA) adopted a mandatory version of the policy. The other two (IEEE and ETSI) 
adopted optional versions. See Contreras, Ex Ante, supra note 36 (discussing this episode). 
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B. Establishment, Composition, and Compensation of Tribunal 
In terms of the institutional “home” of the FRAND Tribunal, it is likely 
that a governmental agency such as a national competition regulator or 
patent office, whether in the United States, Europe, Japan, or elsewhere, 
would raise issues of inherent bias and favoritism and thus attract less 
multilateral support than an international or non-governmental 
organization. Thus, a recognized non-governmental international body 
would likely be a better host for the FRAND Tribunal. Such bodies 
include institutions established specifically for the resolution of 
international disputes, such as the ICC, AAA, London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA), or an international non-governmental 
organization with a broader focus on technology and economic issues 
such as WIPO188 or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).189 Though, as noted above, SDOs have 
traditionally been loath to become involved in royalty negotiations among 
their members,190 an international SDO with a broad base of support and 
international recognition such as the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) might serve as a suitable host for the FRAND 
Tribunal. Finally, smaller and more specialized ADR bodies have arisen 
around the world, some of which advertise expertise in patent disputes.191 
The initial expenses of forming the FRAND Tribunal and selecting its 
members will be borne by the FRAND Tribunal’s host institution, though 
it is not inconceivable that government agencies supporting the improved 
determination of FRAND royalties may also extend funding to this effort. 
Contributions from corporate donors could also be solicited, but it is 
important that the impartiality of the FRAND Tribunal be maintained. 
Thus, corporate interests should have no role, formal or informal, in the 
governance or oversight of the tribunal. 
It is anticipated that the FRAND Tribunal will have ongoing existence 
and will thus have a pool of arbitrators available to hear cases as they 
arise. Individual matters will be heard by panels of three arbitrators 
                                                     
188. WIPO is one of four authorized arbitral bodies for UDRP domain name disputes, the other 
three being the Forum (formerly the National Arbitration Forum), the Czech Arbitration Court (CAC), 
and the Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (ADNDRC). See supra note 136 and 
accompanying text. 
189. Care should be taken, however, to avoid linking the tribunal to an industry association with a 
clear bias either toward patent holders or product manufacturers. 
190. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying discussion. 
191. See, e.g., FEDARB, SPECIALIZED PANELS, https://www.fedarb.com/specialized-panels/ 
[https://perma.cc/C6VA-6NKJ] (offering more than thirty retired judges and other experienced 
neutrals with expertise in patent law). 
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selected at random from the pool, with a chair selected from among the 
three panel members.192 Individual compensation of the three panel 
members will be equal, with no additional compensation to the chair.193 
All members of the FRAND Tribunal will be selected by consensus of 
the SDOs that have mandated the tribunal’s use in resolving FRAND 
disputes. Each arbitrator must have substantial expertise in technical 
standardization processes and not be employed by, or serve as a consultant 
to, any private company having a direct interest in the outcome of such 
disputes (i.e., a SEP holder or product manufacturer).194 The tribunal 
should not include individuals who serve primarily as government 
officials. It is anticipated that tribunal members will generally consist of 
retired judges, private legal practitioners, academics, and consultants.195 
Unlike conventional arbitration, the fees of the tribunal will not be paid 
by the parties initiating the proceeding.196 Rather, it is proposed that a 
small surcharge be imposed on each royalty payment concerning a SEP 
covering the relevant standard. These surcharges would be collected by 
the tribunal and used to cover the tribunal’s costs and expenses, including 
payment to the individual arbitrators. This approach would fairly spread 
the cost of the tribunal among all users of the standard and holders of 
patents essential to the standard, rather than burdening the initial parties 
to a proceeding with the cost of a proceeding that is likely to benefit a 
much larger segment of the market.197 
                                                     
192. See BORN, supra note 120, at 453–54 (describing current practices for arbitration panel 
selection). 
193. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration 
Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 1189, 1210 (2003) (describing methods for 
compensating arbitrators). 
194. This proposed requirement finds support in the expertise requirements of the CRB. See supra 
note 164 and accompanying text. 
195. With regard to the selection of a committee of impartial experts on FRAND-related issues, it 
may be informative to review the selection process and criteria used by the U.S. National Academies 
of Science when forming its Committee on Intellectual Property Management in Standard-Setting 
Processes. See, e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 39, at v (listing committee members, including the 
author of this comment); Call for Experts on Licensing and Valuation of Standard Essential Patents, 
EUROPEAN COMM’N (July 5, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/call-experts-licensing-and-
valuation-standard-essential-patents_en [https://perma.cc/FN4V-LJG7] (the European Commission’s 
recent call for experts’ applications). 
196. These fees, which include both charges for the arbitrators’ time and expenses, the facility, and 
the arbitral tribunal, can be sizable. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do 
Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 433, 447–49 (2010) 
(discussing arbitral fees). 
197. This approach bears similarities to the manner in which ICANN funds its operations through 
a surcharge on the fees paid by every domain name registrant. See MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE 
ROOT 188–90 (2002). 
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This being said, the compensation of individual members of the 
tribunal should be based on a fixed or hourly rate and should not be tied 
to royalty revenue. Creating any dependency between arbitrator 
compensation and patent royalty revenue would have the clear potential 
to bias tribunal rulings in favor of higher royalty determinations. 
Individual tribunal member compensation should thus be wholly 
independent of the outcome of any given rate determination. 
C. Tribunal’s Limited Authority 
The tribunal’s authority will be limited to the determination of 
worldwide FRAND royalty rates for all SEPs covering the standard(s) in 
question, as well as the allocation of these royalties among holders of the 
relevant SEPs. To make these determinations, the tribunal will likely be 
required to consider issues of patent validity and essentiality.198 The 
tribunal’s authority will not, however, extend to royalty rates for patents 
that are not SEPs, making it important that SEP holders offer potential 
product manufacturers an option to obtain a license that includes only 
SEPs.199 By the same token, manufacturers should have the option to pay 
royalties solely in cash at the determined rates, rather than through a 
combination of cash payments, rebates, marketing allowances, cross-
licensing offsets and the like. 
Likewise, the FRAND Tribunal’s authority should not extend to the 
adjudication of other claims between parties (e.g., breach of contract, 
antitrust/competition law violations, patent misuse, fraud, inequitable 
conduct and other forms of malfeasance). While international arbitrators 
                                                     
198. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1152–56 (evidence regarding patent validity and 
essentiality should be considered). It is possible that an arbitrator’s consideration of the validity and 
infringement of SEPs in determining a FRAND royalty rate might not require an individual 
determination of the validity and infringement of every patent under consideration, but could be 
assessed on a statistical or aggregate basis. 
199. Some SEP holders—Qualcomm in particular—have in the past been reported to require 
manufacturers to license both SEPs and non-SEPs as a package, with no option to license SEPs alone. 
See, e.g., Lewis Ho & Monique Lee, Qualcomm Transforms SEP-Licensing Landscape in China, 
LAW360 (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/638183/qualcomm-transforms-sep-
licensing-landscape-in-china (last visited Apr. 28, 2019). This practice was among those condemned 
by the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 2015, resulting in a $975 
million fine against Qualcomm and an order requiring it to reform its licensing practices. Id. Recent 
testimony suggests that Qualcomm now offers a SEP-only licensing option to manufacturers. See 
Dorothy Atkins, Qualcomm Exec Says Google, FTC Deal Was Royalties Model, LAW360 (Jan. 18, 
2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1120159/qualcomm-exec-says-google-ftc-deal-was-
royalties-model (last visited Apr. 28, 2019). According to a Qualcomm official, Qualcomm “generally 
charges a 5 percent royalty fee for its entire patent portfolio, a 3.35 percent fee for only its SEPs and 
a 2.275 percent fee for SEPs covering single-mode cellular technology.” Id. 
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are generally recognized as competent to adjudicate such issues under the 
New York Convention,200 the introduction of non-rate disputes to the 
FRAND Tribunal’s scope of activity has the potential to distract from the 
complex job of determining FRAND royalty rates and to burden 
proceedings with time- and resource-consuming matters that could delay 
rate determinations. Thus, it is recommended that all non-rate claims 
should remain subject to adjudication in any court having jurisdiction over 
the parties and that such court look to the FRAND Tribunal solely for the 
rates established as FRAND. 
Though most recent disputes regarding FRAND licenses have involved 
the determination of royalty rates, many non-royalty terms and conditions 
are included in the license agreements between SEP holders and 
manufacturers (e.g., reciprocity, grant-backs, defensive suspension, 
transfer of obligations, term, termination, etc.).201 In some cases, 
arbitrators and courts actively dictate these non-royalty terms.202 
However, this Article recommends that the FRAND Tribunal limit its 
findings solely to FRAND royalty rates and that disputes regarding other 
license agreement terms and their breach be decided through other 
adjudicatory mechanisms. This narrow and exclusive focus on FRAND 
royalty rates is critical, as the FRAND Tribunal, unlike an ordinary 
arbitrator, will consider the entire panoply of patents covering a particular 
standard held by multiple patent holders, rather than a particular licensing 
transaction between a single patent holder and manufacturer. 
D. Tribunal Procedure 
A FRAND Tribunal proceeding will be initiated when any SDO 
participant petitions the Tribunal for a FRAND rate determination with 
respect to a standard promulgated (or under development) by a 
participating SDO. In making its determinations, the FRAND Tribunal 
will consider evidence from all interested parties, including SEP holders, 
                                                     
200. See generally BORN, supra note 120, at 6. 
201. See, e.g., COMM. ON TECH. STANDARDIZATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 
PATENT POLICY MANUAL 56–67 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2007) (discussing material terms of SEP 
license agreements). 
202. The FTC, in its Google/Motorola Order, required that Google commit to enter into license 
agreements on “terms and conditions established by the arbitrator,” including terms and conditions 
beyond the bare royalty rate. Google Order, supra note 124, at 10. Likewise, the U.K. court in 
Unwired Planet appended a draft license agreement to its opinion in the case, requiring that the 
implementer enter into an agreement on those precise terms. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei 
Tech. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 1304 [Attachment]. 
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implementers, and representatives of the SDO.203 SDO participants will 
agree to provide the tribunal with all reasonable information concerning 
their SEPs covering a standard under review, including licensing terms 
offered to other parties (which will be disclosed confidentially to the 
tribunal and not shared with other SDO participants except on an 
aggregated basis). Like the Copyright Royalty Board, the tribunal may 
choose to admit hearsay evidence and allow limited discovery.204 
Given historical evidence of over-declaration of SEPs at major 
SDOs,205 the FRAND Tribunal will be authorized to consider the 
essentiality of patents to the standards in question. However, a patent-by-
patent analysis, particularly when hundreds or thousands of patents are at 
issue, would be impractical. Thus, it is advisable that an essentiality 
analysis be conducted only in response to a party’s presentation of some 
evidence that a particular patent or patents is not essential to the standard 
in question. That is, there should be a rebuttable presumption that declared 
SEPs are essential to the standard. However, if a SEP holder is found to 
have declared non-essential patents as SEPs, the FRAND Tribunal should 
also be authorized to impose reasonable penalties, such as reducing the 
SEP holder’s apportioned share for those of its patents that are found to 
be SEPs.206 
The FRAND Tribunal should aim to resolve all matters as 
expeditiously as possible, preferably within twelve months of initiation. 
While aggressive, this timing is feasible if all parties cooperate with the 
tribunal’s requests and discovery is limited.207 Unlike a court, the FRAND 
Tribunal panel in any given case will not have a docket of other matters 
to contend with, enabling it to devote substantial attention to the matter at 
hand. 
                                                     
203. There is ample precedent for such multi-party proceedings—in the context of copyright rate-
setting, for example. See Bartlett & Contreras, supra note 27 (discussing multi-party interpleader 
proceedings in a range of contexts); Strickler, supra note 166. 
204. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 803(b)(6)(C)(iii)–(iv) (2018) (Copyright Royalty Board - admissible evidence 
and discovery). 
205. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
206. See Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 17, at 82–83 (proposing apportionment penalty for 
over-declaration). 
207. It is worth noting that proceedings concerning patent infringement at the International Trade 
Commission are generally resolved in a speedier manner than district court litigation. See Rodney R. 
Sweetland III & Michael McManus, Discovery Is Swift and Expansive at the ITC, EXEC. COUNS., Jan. 
2012, at 25, https://issuu.com/todaysgc/docs/executive_counsel_decjan12 (last visited Apr. 18, 
2019). 
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The FRAND Tribunal’s formal procedures208 will be developed in 
compliance with the requirements of the New York Convention209 so as 
to be binding and enforceable in all Convention signatory states. This 
feature of the FRAND Tribunal is critical, as recognition of its 
determinations under the New York Convention obviates the need for 
independent national rate-setting proceedings, thus eliminating the 
inconsistency that arises when multiple adjudicatory bodies address the 
same issues using different methodological approaches. Herein lies a 
significant advantage of situating the tribunal within a recognized 
international arbitral body that has already developed a baseline set of 
procedural rules and practices that are consistent with the requirements of 
the Convention. 
E. Stay of Injunctive Relief 
The question whether a SEP holder is legally permitted to seek 
injunctive relief against a potential licensee to whom it owes a FRAND 
commitment has been debated extensively by commentators, 
governmental agencies, and courts.210 Arguments have been made both 
for and against the availability of such injunctions under equitable 
remedies law, antitrust and competition law, and basic economic 
principles.211 At most, it can safely be said that a FRAND commitment 
                                                     
208. For example, time, location and language of proceedings, rules surrounding timing of 
discovery, length and format of written submissions, oral arguments, etc. 
209. See New York Convention, supra note 123, art. II, V (requirements for enforceability of 
arbitral awards). 
210. For an overview of this debate and the current state of the law in various countries, see 
Contreras, Global Standards Wars, supra note 1, at 24–29; Jorge L. Contreras et al., The Effect of 
FRAND Commitments on Patent Remedies, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: 
TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS, ch. 5 (C. Bradford Biddle et al. eds., forthcoming 2019); Pierre 
Larouche & Nicolo Zingales, Injunctive Relief in the EU – Intellectual Property and Competition Law 
at the Remedies Stage, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 6, ch. 25; J. Gregory Sidak, Injunctive 
Relief and the FRAND Commitment in the United States, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 6, 
ch. 24. 
211. Some litigants have argued that a SEP holder, by making a FRAND commitment, implicitly 
agrees not to exclude others from the market, but instead agrees to collect only a reasonable royalty 
for the use of its SEPs. As a result, it has been argued in the United Stats that a SEP holder should 
automatically be barred from seeking injunctive relief under the U.S. Supreme Court’s four-part test 
in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). Considering this issue in Apple v. 
Motorola, 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014)the Federal Circuit held that while there should not be a per 
se rule prohibiting the holder of a SEP from seeking an injunction, a SEP holder could have difficulty 
showing “irreparable harm” under the eBay test if it has previously made a FRAND commitment. Id. 
at 1332. Further complicating matters, there are signs that the U.S. DOJ may now have a different 
view regarding injunctions and FRAND-encumbered SEPs. In a recent speech, the head of the DOJ’s 
Antitrust Division was critical of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Apple v. Motorola and expressed 
skepticism about the denial of injunctive relief to SEP holders. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney 
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limits a SEP holder’s ability to seek injunctive relief against an infringing 
product manufacturer, so long as that manufacturer is willing to accept a 
license on FRAND terms.212 The precise contours and conditions of that 
limitation are dependent, however, on a variety of factors that vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and which have evolved over time. 
One thing that is relatively clear, however, is the ability of parties 
voluntarily to waive their rights to seek injunctive relief through private 
mechanisms. Recently, such waivers have featured prominently in the 
standard-setting context. In 2012 and 2013, several large technology firms 
voluntarily committed not to seek injunctions under SEPs in connection 
with Department of Justice approval of their patent-related acquisitions.213 
And in 2015, the IEEE Standards Association (IEEE-SA), a major SDO, 
approved an amendment to its patent policy that required its members to 
forego injunctive relief against manufacturers of products implementing 
IEEE standards except under certain limited circumstances.214 
This Article recommends that SDOs impose a moratorium on 
injunctive relief during the pendency of FRAND rate-setting proceedings, 
specifically those that are mandatory, but possibly optional proceedings 
                                                     
Gen., Remarks at the U.S.C. Gould Sch. of Law Ctr. for Transnational Law & Bus. (Nov. 10, 2017) 
(transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorneygeneral-makan-
delrahim-delivers-remarks-usc-gould-school-laws-center [https://perma.cc/SV4T-Z8P6]); Ryan 
Davis, Antitrust Chief’s SEP Injunction Speech Puts Focus on Courts, LAW360 (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1111832/antitrust-chief-s-sep-injunction-speech-puts-focus-on-
courts (last visited Apr. 28, 2019). 
The analytical framework in Europe for assessing whether the enforcement of a FRAND-
encumbered SEP constitutes an abuse of dominance was established by the European Court of Justice 
(CJEU) in Case C-170/13, Huawei v. ZTE (July 16, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
document/document.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=1&part=1&mode=lst&docid=165911&oc
c=first&dir=&cid=3858 [https://perma.cc/J8HR-GP5Q]. In Huawei, the SEP holder sought an 
injunction against the implementer of a standard. Id. at ¶ 27. The CJEU held that if a SEP holder 
possesses market dominance, then in order to avoid violating Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the SEP holder must comply with a series of procedural 
steps. Id. at ¶ 71. Likewise, in order to preserve its ability to challenge the SEP holder’s seeking an 
injunction, the infringer must comply with a similar set of procedural steps. Id. The combination of 
these behavioral requirements has been referred to as the Huawei “choreography”. Since the Huawei 
decision, a number of cases in Germany and other EU member states have sought to interpret these 
requirements with mixed success. See ROBIN JACOB & ALEXANDER MILNER, 4IP COUNCIL, LESSONS 
FROM HUAWEI V. ZTE 10 (2016), http://www.4ipcouncil.com/news/latest-research-4ip-council-
lessons-huawei-v-zte [https://perma.cc/B9C5-E78V].  
212. See Apple, 757 F.3d at 1332; FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT 
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 235 (2011). 
213. See Contreras, Global Standards Wars, supra note 1 (discussing commitments made by 
Apple, Microsoft and Motorola to refrain from seeking injunctive relief against infringers of SEPs). 
214. See IEEE Policy, supra note 15; Harri Kalimo et al., supra note 142, at 155 (discussing 
proposed ETSI “balanced safe harbour” approach). 
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as well.215 Doing so will reduce potential disruptions to the market while 
the financial terms of required FRAND licenses are determined. It will 
also eliminate a significant potential threat that SEP holders could assert 
against product manufacturers to distort the testimony and evidence 
brought forward at rate-setting proceedings. This prohibition on seeking 
injunctive relief would not, however, be permanent. Once FRAND royalty 
rates are determined for a specific standard, a SEP holder will be permitted 
to pursue injunctions against product manufacturers that refuse to accept 
an otherwise fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory license at the 
designated rate within a reasonable period of time.216 
F. Tribunal Determinations 
The FRAND Tribunal will base its decisions on evidence and briefing 
presented by the parties, as well as its own investigation of applicable law 
and relevant SDO policies. If the legal rules governing a particular SDO 
policy are not within the competency of the Tribunal members (e.g., U.S. 
members of the Tribunal may not be versed in French law, which governs 
ETSI’s policies),217 then reliable testimony regarding the relevant laws 
should be obtained through unbiased expert testimony.218 In some cases, 
extrinsic evidence regarding accepted interpretations of otherwise 
ambiguous or incomplete SDO policy language may be necessary, and the 
Tribunal should be authorized to seek such evidence through testimony of 
reliable witnesses.219 
                                                     
215. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1142–43 (“SSOs should explicitly state in their IP 
policies that a patent holder making a FRAND commitment has given up its right to seek an injunction 
against any willing licensee for infringement of its standard-essential patents.”).  
216. A useful guide for determining when a potential licensee is not acting in good faith may be 
the line of cases deriving from the European Court of Justice decision in Case C-170/13, Huawei 
(providing guidelines for assessing whether SEP holder’s seeking of injunctive relief constitutes 
violation of EU competition law, dependent in part on conduct of the potential licensee). See JACOB 
& MILNER, supra note 211; Larouche & Zingales, supra note 210; Nicolas Petit, EU Competition 
Law Analysis of FRAND Disputes, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK, supra note 6, ch. 17. 
217. See Contreras, Lex Mercatoria, supra note 26, ¶ 18 (describing application of French law in 
U.S. and U.K. cases involving ETSI standards). 
218. See, e.g., Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: 
Opening the Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887 (2011) 
(describing how U.S. courts can and should gain understanding of foreign laws that they are required 
to apply). 
219. It is not uncommon for courts to seek witness testimony to discern the intent of unclear or 
incomplete SDO policy language. See Jorge L. Contreras, From Private Ordering to Public Law: The 
Legal Framework Governing Standards-Essential Patents, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 211, 219 (2017) 
(SDO policy interpretation informed by participant testimony in Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 
318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003) and Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 
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Following the model of the CRB, the FRAND Tribunal will make 
decisions by majority vote, with any dissenting views specifically set forth 
in the tribunal’s written opinion.220 The FRAND Tribunal’s sole charge 
will be to determine a top-down, aggregate FRAND royalty rate 
applicable to the standard in question and establish an allocation of the 
resulting royalties among the different holders of SEPs covering that 
standard.221 The FRAND Tribunal will be empowered to utilize any 
reasonable methodology to determine such rates. While, as noted in 
Section I.A above, courts that have adopted top-down royalty calculation 
methodologies to date have relied on data that can be characterized as 
incomplete, imprecise, and self-serving,222 more sophisticated analytical 
methods are available and have been used in non-litigation contexts.223 
FRAND rates may be structured by the Tribunal according to any 
reasonable rate schedule (including rates that vary by country, are 
volume-based, and which vary by tier in the distribution chain), subject to 
any particular limitations of the relevant SDO rules. 
The allocation of any aggregate (top-down) royalty established for a 
particular standard will be presumed to be divided among individual SEPs 
on a numerical proportionality basis (i.e., one patent, one share) unless the 
evidence strongly suggests that particular SEPs are deserving of a greater 
or lesser share.224 It will be up to the FRAND Tribunal to evaluate such 
evidence and devise an appropriate allocation methodology. 
Unlike arbitral and rate-setting bodies established under national law, 
decisions of the FRAND Tribunal will not normally be subject to judicial 
oversight or review.225 The only challenges to tribunal decisions will be 
those judicial challenges permitted to be made to any arbitral decision 
under the New York Convention—i.e., on grounds of bias, contradiction 
                                                     
2008)); Contreras, Lex Mercatoria, supra note 26, at 262–63 (proposing the codification of a set of 
common understandings relating to SDO policies). 
220. See 17 U.S.C. § 803(a)(3) (2018) (Copyright Royalty Board makes decisions by majority 
vote). 
221. See supra Section I.A.2 and accompanying text. 
222. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
223. See Independent Economic Study Suggests HEVC Royalties Should be Comparable to or Less 
than Rates for AVC, UNIFIED PATENTS (Jan. 9, 2019), 
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2019/1/9/independent-economic-study-suggests-hevc-
royalties-should-be-comparable-to-or-less-than-rates-for-avc [https://perma.cc/9FCN-CYMY]. 
224. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1151 (FRAND royalties need not be determined on 
a patent-by-patent basis).  
225. For example, royalty rate decisions of the Copyright Royalty Board are subject to appeal to 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(1).  
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of law and public policy.226 Otherwise, the only recourse when parties 
disagree with the FRAND Tribunal’s decisions is for the relevant SDO to 
revise its policies so as to remove reliance on the FRAND Tribunal in 
future disputes. 
Importantly, the FRAND Tribunal will have no enforcement or 
collection authority. It will merely determine FRAND rates as set forth 
above. In the event of non-payment, the relevant parties will be entitled to 
seek appropriate administrative or legal remedies. 
G. Public Disclosure 
As noted above, arbitration proceedings are conducted privately and all 
parties, including the arbitrators, are required to maintain the 
confidentiality of the evidence presented, the parties’ arguments, and the 
arbitral award.227 The proceedings of the FRAND Tribunal, however, 
should be different. Its determinations, reasoning, and methodology 
should be made publicly available in the interest of transparency and 
fostering consistency of future decisions. 
It is particularly important that the FRAND Tribunal explain its 
reasoning in a detailed written opinion that clearly enunciates any 
dissenting views. Reasoned decisions are valuable, as they inform the 
parties of the grounds on which the tribunal’s rulings are based. Moreover, 
an unreasoned arbitral award is more vulnerable to subsequent judicial 
challenge on grounds of public policy.228 As in judicial proceedings, 
certain highly confidential materials may be placed under protective order 
and excluded from the public record.229 
Several positive effects are likely to arise from the public disclosure of 
the FRAND Tribunal’s proceedings. As numerous commentators have 
noted, it is notoriously difficult to determine, or even estimate, a FRAND 
royalty rate when the license agreements and settlements relating to the 
relevant SEPs are confidential.230 Opening the results of FRAND rate-
                                                     
226. See BORN, supra note 120, at 795–96. 
227. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.  
228. See BORN, supra note 120, at 832 cmt. 16 (unreasoned awards are vulnerable to revocation by 
courts based on public policy grounds); id. at 918 (unreasoned awards are less likely to be given 
collateral estoppel effect if re-litigated). 
229. For example, certain documents, such as license agreements covering both SEPs and other 
intellectual property rights and non-standardized technologies, may have legitimate claims to some 
degree of confidentiality. It should be up to the tribunal to fashion reasonable rules regarding the 
protection of confidential information adduced during its proceedings. 
230. See Contreras & Newman, supra note 22, at 40; Gilbert, supra note 14, at 870; Lemley & 
Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1145; Patterson, supra note 21, at 864.  
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setting proceedings to the public would begin to establish a base of 
information relating to SEP royalties that could begin to eliminate the 
uncertainty that currently exists in the market.231 Such improved 
transparency could help parties to negotiate more appropriate FRAND 
licenses and make verification of SEP holders’ compliance with the non-
discrimination prong of the FRAND requirement easier. 
H. Antitrust and Competition Considerations 
As noted above, some SDOs have historically been wary of 
participating in or facilitating the discussion of patent royalty rates or 
other commercial issues pertaining to products implementing their 
standards.232 These concerns have been fueled largely by fear of potential 
liability under antitrust and competition law. Specifically, it has been 
suggested that an SDO may act as a vehicle for product manufacturers to 
exert oligopsonistic anticompetitive pressure against a SEP holder, 
potentially depressing royalty rates below reasonable levels and even to 
zero.233 Another objection is based on the potential chilling effect that 
such concerted action could have on innovation around standardized 
technologies.234 These concerns have been rekindled recently by officials 
at the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, who have indicated 
that renewed scrutiny may be applied to collusive behavior within 
SDOs.235 While numerous commentators, including the author, have 
attempted to assuage these concerns,236 Pierre Régibeau and collaborators 
                                                     
231. For similar reasons, Lemley and Shapiro propose that arbitration decisions be disclosed to 
“willing licensees.” Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 114, at 1145–46 (“[S]ecrecy would undermine the 
effectiveness of the FRAND regime.”).  
232. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text (discussing SDO policies against intervening 
in FRAND licensing or interpretation). 
233. J. Gregory Sidak, Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 123, 126, 142–51 (2009) (“[E]x ante collective action 
that is privately undertaken in an [SDO] to counteract potential patent holdup may facilitate, if not 
serve as an outright façade for, horizontal price fixing by oligopsonists of the patented input.”). 
234. Farrell et al., supra note 93, at 632 (“The potential danger . . . is that by negotiating as a group, 
technology users could extract such favorable terms from patent holders (another form of hold-up) 
that they will inefficiently discourage future innovation.”). 
235. See Jorge L. Contreras, Essay, Taking It to the Limit: Shifting U.S. Antitrust Policy Toward 
Standards Development, 103 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 66 (2018), 
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Contreras_1fmt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6NQH-DVSG]. 
236. See, e.g., Contreras, Aggregated Royalties, supra note 17, at 705 (“Like the holders of pooled 
patents, SDO participants can achieve efficiencies and other procompetitive benefits by coordinating 
the aggregate rates at which SEPs covering a standard are licensed.”); Farrell et al., supra note 93, at 
635 (suggesting that one beneficial approach “would be to permit members of an SSO collectively to 
negotiate royalties with patent holders, so long as membership in the SSO does not preclude any 
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may be correct in their observation that “part of the antitrust community 
still has an almost instinctive allergy to the idea of rivals setting prices 
together.”237 
The proposed FRAND Tribunal addresses these concerns by removing 
any price determination or negotiation activity from the SDO or its 
participants and placing rate-setting authority in the hands of an 
independent arbitral body. Moreover, the proposed public disclosure of 
FRAND Tribunal deliberations and decisions is likely to fit more 
comfortably within existing antitrust rules than the secrecy that currently 
pervades this market.238 As a result, the proposed rate-setting mechanism, 
like any judicial or arbitration procedure, should remain less subject to 
antitrust and competition law concerns than private negotiation of 
FRAND royalty rates. 
I. Tradeoffs: Precision Versus Efficiency 
Admittedly, there are tradeoffs involved when non-judicial dispute 
resolution mechanisms are used in lieu of litigation. In general, the 
arbitration of commercial disputes has been criticized due to the 
unavailability of appellate review of decisions: if an arbitrator makes a 
mistake, it is often difficult or impossible to correct.239 As the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted in 1994, “[a]rbitration provides 
neither the procedural protections nor the assurance of the proper 
application of substantive law offered by the judicial system.”240 For these 
                                                     
individual firm, or group of firms acting in concert, from producing competing products that do not 
comply with the standard”); Kühn et al., supra note 14, at 3 (“This joint action is acceptable for society 
because it trades off possible technology competition among SSO members for production of a 
standard that can speed innovation and expand output.”); Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra 
note 65, at 2043–44 (stating that collective negotiation of SEP royalty rates is “very likely to be 
procompetitive if the technology would otherwise be so encumbered by patent rights and blocking 
positions that the standard would have difficulty moving forward in the market”); Lemley, Ten 
Things, supra note 43, at 161 (“[T]he law ought to permit SSO members the latitude to discuss royalty 
rates collectively before the standard is set.”); Robert A. Skitol, Concerted Buying Power: Its 
Potential for Addressing the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 727, 
735 (2005) (noting that joint negotiation may improve the “quality of decision making” within an 
SDO and “increase[] the prospects for achieving a procompetitive ‘open’ standards outcome”). 
237. RÉGIBEAU ET AL., supra note 36, at 45. 
238. See Patterson, supra note 21 (raising antitrust concerns arising from lack of transparency in 
FRAND licensing transactions). 
239. See Drahozal & Ware, supra note 196, at 455 (“Just as a trial court’s decision may be 
erroneous, so might an arbitrator’s award. But it is far more likely that a trial court’s erroneous 
ruling will be overturned on appeal than an arbitrator’s erroneous ruling will be vacated by a 
court.”); Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 122, at 340. 
240. Bowles Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 22 F.3d 1010, 1011 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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reasons, firms may feel that arbitration of disputes is risky, particularly in 
the case of “bet the company” litigation.241 One well-known study of 
arbitration clauses in public company contracts found that only eleven 
percent of all business-to-business contracts (and thirty-three percent of 
licensing agreements) included arbitration clauses.242 
Additionally, the FRAND Tribunal could face issues similar to those 
faced in bilateral arbitration. Specifically, the proposed rate-setting 
mechanism may not result in awards to individual patent holders that are 
equivalent to what they might receive in national litigation or in private 
negotiations.243 Moreover, it is not expected that the allocations 
determined by the FRAND Tribunal will precisely account for the value 
of each patent held in a particular firm’s portfolio, nor does the tribunal 
format allow for appeal of results that are not to the liking of a particular 
party. 
Nevertheless, it is worth remembering that a high degree of precision 
is neither expected nor delivered in the private bilateral negotiations that 
result in FRAND licenses today, where portfolios of hundreds or 
thousands of patents are licensed for a simple percentage royalty rate. 
Given the large number of patents and patent holders participating in 
many of today’s most critical industry standards, precise compensation on 
a patent-by-patent basis is not a realistic expectation nor a necessary 
condition to the functioning of the market. Rather, in order for the 
marketplace to operate efficiently and to enable the broadest 
dissemination of standardized technology around the world, the proposal 
set forth in this Article aspires to produce, in the words of the Internet 
standards body IETF, “rough consensus and running code.”244 Thus, it is 
hoped that a small sacrifice in terms of precision will achieve larger gains 
in terms of overall efficiency, predictability, and market stability. 
                                                     
241. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 196, at 455 (quoting Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. 
Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 79–80 (2008)). 
242. Eisenberg & Miller, Arbitration, supra note 122, at 351, tbl.2. 
243. Moreover, rates set by a FRAND Tribunal could effectively act as a ceiling on rates privately 
negotiated by parties, much as the compulsory mechanical copyright royalty rates set by the CRB 
have become ceilings on the amounts that can be charged for mechanical music licenses. See Howard 
B. Abrams, Copyright’s First Compulsory License, 26 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 215, 235 
(2009) (“The statutory royalty rate has become a ceiling rather than a floor for the earnings of music 
publishers and their composers and lyricists from recordings.”).  
244. Dave Clark, A Cloudy Crystal Ball - Visions of the Future, Presentation at the Proceedings of 
the Twenty-Fourth Internet Engineering Task Force, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH 
INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE 543, slide 19 (Megan Davies et al. eds., 1992), 
https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/24.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2019). 
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J. Navigating the Political Economy of Standard-Setting 
Despite any overall welfare-enhancing benefits of the proposed 
FRAND Tribunal, one may legitimately ask why individual SDOs and 
SDO participants, each acting in its own fiscal best interest, would ever 
consent to such a system. SEP holders seemingly prefer the status quo, in 
which FRAND rates are largely determined in secret bilateral negotiations 
with product manufacturers and only occasionally reach a judicial 
determination.245 Large manufacturers may prefer to take their chances in 
the national courts, particularly if local rules are perceived to favor their 
positions. And SDOs, which are ultimately dues-driven membership 
organizations, may be reluctant to adopt policy changes that are perceived 
to be detrimental to particular member interests, due to both the effort and 
resource commitment required to such amendments approved and the 
potential loss of members who opposed the policy change.246 
Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the proposed FRAND 
Tribunal may find support where other proposals to reform the FRAND 
system have not. First, the cost of litigating complex patents and economic 
theories across multiple jurisdictions is significant, even for the largest 
firms.247 The proposed FRAND Tribunal is likely to reduce the cost of 
dispute resolution for all parties involved, not to mention freeing valuable 
time currently spent by corporate executives and engineers on litigation. 
Second, litigation over FRAND commitments often brings with it a 
number of ancillary claims that can have serious repercussions for firms, 
including claims sounding in fraud, unfair business practices, and 
violations of antitrust and competition law.248 Resolving disagreements 
over FRAND royalty rates through non-judicial rate-setting could reduce 
                                                     
245. Contreras, Ex Ante, supra note 36, at 206–07 (describing self-interested opposition to SDO 
transparency measures by patent-centric firms). 
246. See id. at 174–77 (discussing member opposition to SDO policy amendments at VITA, ETSI, 
and IEEE); supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of 2015 IEEE policy 
amendments). 
247. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 
WIS. L. REV. 905, 932 n.107 (“[M]y estimate based on conversations with people close to the cases 
is that the parties in the ongoing smartphone litigation have already spent at least $1 billion in legal 
fees, and the cases are far from over.”); Susan Deckeret et al., Apple, Samsung Declare Peace in 
Biggest Modern Tech Patent Fight, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2018, 3:29 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-27/apple-samsung-settle-patent-infringement-
dispute (last visited Apr. 18, 2019) (“litigation cost each company hundreds of millions of dollars in 
legal fees.”).  
248. See Microsoft v. Motorola, 795 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2015); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 
773 F.3d 1201, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2014); TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktenbologet 
LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-00341 JVS, 2016 WL 4150033, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2016). 
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or eliminate the risk of these ancillary but serious claims. That is, even 
though such ancillary claims could, in theory, result in a series of costly 
and time-consuming national actions, it is likely that the resolution of the 
principal issue at the core of these disputes—the FRAND royalty rate—
will dissuade parties from pursuing these ancillary claims further. 
Finally, parties in FRAND-related litigation have routinely sought to 
enlist the assistance of antitrust and competition enforcement agencies in 
advancing their causes, leading to numerous agency investigations, legal 
actions, and penalties against major market participants.249 Resolving 
FRAND rate disputes early through a FRAND Tribunal would lessen the 
incentive of parties to draw the conduct of their negotiation adversaries to 
the attention of governmental officials and would thus reduce the 
likelihood of governmental intervention in these markets—a desirable 
outcome for many firms.250 
CONCLUSION 
The commitment to license patents that are essential to technical 
interoperability standards on FRAND terms is intended to foster the rapid 
development and broad adoption of standards necessary to the modern 
technological infrastructure. Yet disputes over FRAND royalty rates 
continue to bedevil participants in global technology markets, leading to 
increased litigation and progressively inconsistent results from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Moreover, the lack of transparency in current 
licensing transactions, coupled with the narrow focus of adjudicators on 
individual parties rather than the totality of rights associated with a 
particular standard, has added further uncertainty and instability to the 
FRAND licensing system. Any proposal to reform the FRAND licensing 
system must thus address three key aspects that are currently lacking in 
the system: transparency, consistency, and comprehensiveness. 
This Article proposes the establishment of a global FRAND rate-setting 
tribunal designed to reduce negotiation, litigation, and other excess 
transaction costs while achieving a fair allocation of resources among 
affected stakeholders. It does so through a mechanism that seeks, to the 
greatest extent possible, to achieve the tripartite goals of transparency, 
consistency, and comprehensiveness. Specifically, it calls for the 
establishment of an international, non-governmental FRAND Tribunal 
and the modification of SDO policies either to mandate or make available 
                                                     
249. See, e.g., Contreras, Global Standards Wars, supra note 1, at 5–13 (describing governmental 
investigations of and actions against Google/Motorola, Samsung, Qualcomm, and others). 
250. This is not to say, of course, that governmental agencies should not maintain their vigilance 
and continue to bring appropriate enforcement actions to curb anticompetitive behavior. 
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the resolution of FRAND royalty disputes through this mechanism. Like 
existing rate-setting bodies such as the U.S. Copyright Royalty Board, the 
FRAND Tribunal will collect all available evidence regarding the 
patented and unpatented technology involved in a particular standard, 
determine an aggregate (top-down) royalty rate for the standard as a 
whole, and appropriately apportion royalties among all holders of 
essential patents. Beyond these rate-setting matters, the FRAND Tribunal 
will adjudicate no other issues, and related claims for breach of contract 
and antitrust and competition law violations would continue to be subject 
to adjudication by any court(s) having jurisdiction. SDO participants 
would be required to refrain from seeking injunctive relief against 
potential licensees during the pendency of rate-setting proceedings, but 
once FRAND royalty rates are determined for a specific standard, a patent 
holder will be permitted to pursue injunctions against product 
manufacturers that refuse to accept a license at the designated rate. 
Though the proposed rate-setting mechanism will not result in awards 
to individual patent holders that precisely account for the value of each 
patent, this degree of precision is neither a realistic expectation nor a 
necessary condition to the functioning of the market. Rather, it is hoped 
that the proposed FRAND Tribunal will make the FRAND licensing 
marketplace operate more efficiently by eliminating excessive transaction 
costs and enabling broad dissemination of standardized technology 
around the world, while still achieving a fair distribution of proceeds 
among affected stakeholders. While further details regarding the 
implementation and operation of the FRAND Tribunal must be 
considered and debated, the general approach outlined in this Article has 
the potential to bring greater predictability and stability to the technology 
development ecosystem while reducing costly and disruptive litigation. 
 
